Ethnicity_Reading Memo

Conflicts in Africa are often characterized in the western media as ethnic conflicts. In my experience, whenever I heard in the news that violence had broken out between two ethnic groups in Africa, my immediate reaction was usually along the lines of “Yeah, that sounds familiar.” I took for granted that ethnicity was the basis of the conflict without a second thought. But after doing the readings for this week, it is apparent that, as Eghosa E. Osaghae and Rotimi T. Suberu state, ethnic diversity is not a sufficient condition for conflict. Thus, the question that this raised for me was: are conflicts that are characterized as ethnic conflicts truly ethnic conflicts?

            The answer to this seems to be yes and no. The answer to whether genocide is a true ethnic conflict seems to be a clear yes, such as the cases of the 1972 genocide in Burundi and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. It is hard to characterize a genocide as any thing other than an ethnic conflict considering that the definition of genocide is the deliberate elimination of another group of people based solely on their ethnicity. Yet the answer is more complex: the readings convincingly demonstrate that ethnicity has been manipulated for political purposes across the whole of the continent, first by European colonial powers as part of a divide and conquer strategy of domination and later by post-colonial faction leaders in order to secure their own military and political power in a given territory.

            In cases where ethnicity has been politicized, such as in South Sudan, branding the conflict as an ethnic one is problematic in that it misrepresents what the conflict is truly about. It distracts from the real causes of the conflict and, if mediators are trying to treat a symptom rather than a cause of the conflict, it can harm efforts to find an end to the violence.

            While Osaghae and Suberu assert that ethnic diversity is not a sufficient condition for conflict, they do say that it is a necessary condition for conflict. I do not agree with this statement. It is an oversimplification to claim that conflict cannot occur without ethnic diversity. There are a multitude of different types of conflict that have nothing to do with ethnicity, such as gender-, religious-, and class-based conflicts. Or what about conflicts within an ethnic group? Presumably a conflict of this nature would be non-ethnic. It is probably better to say that ethnic diversity often plays a role in African conflicts, but it is hardly necessary.

            In the other article by Osaghae that was assigned this week, he argues for state reconstitution based on positive ethnicity. I appreciate the idea that ethnicity does not have to be a negative thing and that too often it is stigmatized as such. Yet using ethnic development units that possess a great degree of autonomy as building blocks of the state could be a doubled-edged sword. Since these units are based on ethnicity, they could reinforce an individual’s or a group’s ethnic identity instead of developing a national identity. Reinforcing ethnic identity is possibly problematic, especially given the autonomy these units would have, because it could lead to a culture of exclusivism and at its most extreme to demands of separatism. Without something binding these ethnic units to the state they would have less and less reason to be submissive to the state as they develop since they would be carrying out the traditional tasks of the state on their own. Moreover, if these ethnic units did reinforce ethnic identity over a national identity, someone could abuse it for their own political power, ending up in a situation where the state is being challenged once again based on politicized ethnicity.

            The last topic I would like to touch on is reconciliation between the Hutu and the Tutsi in the Great Lakes region. René Lemarchand suggests that there can be no peace in this region until the tasks of “shedding light on the circumstances, the scale, and the consequences of the” genocides in 1972, 1994, and 1996-1997 are taken seriously. Yet it is not just truth that is essential to this process, Lemarchand suggests that justice must accompany it hand in hand for peace and stability to be achieved. In an ideal world I would agree with Lemarchand’s sentiment. But in the case of the Hutu and the Tutsi both sides seem to view the situation as zero-sum. This explains why justice has been pursued without reconciliation in Rwanda, as those in power can certainly seek justice, but they have no incentive to seek reconciliation. In fact, neither side wishes to reconcile, each side wants to win out over the other. Lemarchand demonstrates this when he discusses the reaction to the Detmold Confession, how it sparked debate over whether the Hutu or the Tutsi “should bear the onus of guilt,” which was not at all the intention of the document.

            In light of this, I am not sure there can be reconciliation between the Hutu and the Tutsi until their respective mentalities change. But how does one engineer this change in a such an ingrained mentality? Perhaps fostering a national identity over an ethnic identity could help. Or increasing the integration of the two ethnic groups, as I think a person is less likely to hate a certain group of people if they grow up around them. A power-sharing government between Hutu and Tutsi could also set an example for the rest of the country. General amnesty for the “little fish” of the genocides could also help the two communities to move on from the events of 1972, 1994, and 1996-1997. Of course, all of these suggestions would be challenging to implement given the complexity and historical burden of the conflict, and they would require buy in from the communities. In fact, a power-sharing government in Rwanda has already been tried in and has failed. The only certainty is that there is no simple fix in attempting to reconcile two ethnic groups following a genocide.