The most intriguing question that
struck me this week came while I was reading Caitriona Dowd and Adam Drury’s
article that compares Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). That
question is: what drives an insurgency group to adopt suicide bombing tactics?
Why does Boko Haram employ this tactic, but the LRA does not? Unfortunately, Dowd
and Drury do not delve into this. However, they do mention that, in general, the
tactical evolution of both groups has been driven by “the groups’ perceived,
short-term necessity to punish enemies and project power.” This explanation is far
too vague and imprecise, especially considering that the adoption of suicide
attacks represents such a dramatic shift in tactics.
In
the minds of most people, the tactic of suicide bombing is linked with religious
extremism. Since 2001, most terror attacks that make headlines in the Western
world are committed by Muslims who profess a religious motivation for their
actions. Thus, it is apparent that religion is what motivates the adoption of
suicide bombing. Boko Haram is an Islamic fundamentalist group, therefore they
must have begun employing suicide bombers because of the religious nature of
the organization. I am not convinced by this argument. Like Boko Haram, Dowd
and Drury describe the LRA as having articulated a religious/ideological
narrative in order to garner early support. Since both insurgencies are
intertwined with religion it is difficult to ascribe the adoption of suicide
attacks by Boko Haram strictly to a religious motivation.
Yet,
unlike Boko Haram, the LRA is not an Islamic fundamentalist group. Perhaps it
is Islamic fundamentalism in particular that drives insurgency groups to adopt
suicide bombing. In fact, Islamic terrorist groups have been responsible for
most of the suicide attacks since 9/11.[1] Certainly
this demonstrates correlation, but it does not prove causality. Suicide attacks
are not limited to Islamic fundamentalist groups. The Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine are all examples of secular terrorist organizations
that have employed suicide attacks. The LTTE has been particularly prolific. It
carried out the most suicide attacks of any terrorist organization between 1980
and 2003.[2]
With this in
mind, I do not think it is specifically religion that motivates the adoption of
suicide attacks. Religion is an ideology and it is ideology that motivates
suicide attacks. The stronger an ideology is, the more likely it is that
followers of that ideology will be willing to die for it. Islamic
fundamentalism is a particularly powerful ideology that allows no compromise.
Hence, it follows that this ideology played a part in Boko Haram’s adoption of
suicide attacks and that, comparatively, the LRA must not possess as strong of
an ideological underpinning as Boko Haram does.
An alternative
hypothesis is that Boko Haram’s adoption of suicide attacks was more motivated
by the advantages they offer rather than the strength of their ideology. Compared
to more conventional terror tactics, suicide attacks are inexpensive, are
easier to execute, are more likely to succeed, and are extremely lethal.[3]
They also generate a huge amount of press coverage. These are all reasons that
could have played into Boko Haram’s adoption of suicide attacks. Then again, if
suicide attacks offer so many advantages, why have the LRA not begun utilizing
them? This is clearly an area for further research, and Dowd and Drury do
mention that work is being done on the issue of suicide bombing.
The next question
I would like to discuss was raised by Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos at the
very end of his article: is the “challenge of jihad in Africa…an opportunity to
improve governance”? Undoubtedly, the answer is yes. But that answer is
contingent on some caveats, specifically, it depends on how the state chooses
to combat terrorism. For instance, if the state chooses to “kill a mosquito
with a hammer” as the Kenyan government has chosen to do, the result will not
be a modernized and more democratic government. The Kenyan government is acting
in a totalitarian manner when it conducts programs like the Usalama Watch, when
it ignores human rights, and when it allows corruption and abuse of power to
continue unchecked. Totally ignoring the rights of their Somalian population is
not conducive to further modernizing or democratizing the Kenyan government. By
choosing to react in a totalitarian manner to the threat of Al-Shabaab, the
Kenyan government has actually weakened itself by undermining the security of
and alienating its Somali and Muslim population, which has pushed them into the
arms of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is now stronger and more of a threat to
destabilize the Kenyan state.
Conversely,
modernizing and democratizing states are solid counter-terrorism policies. To
defeat an insurgency, the state must seek the moral high-ground and become a
paragon of justice. It cannot abuse human rights or allow corruption to have
free reign. It must enact policies and programs that seek to care for and
protect its citizens. It must become more inclusive, allowing minority groups
to have a say in the future of the state. These actions are important because
if the terrorist organization cannot convince the population that the
government is their enemy, the organization loses much of its power. I think
many insurgencies originate from the failure of the state to provide for their
citizens. Therefore, through modernization and democratization states can combat
terrorism.
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