Ethnicity_Reading Memo

Conflicts in Africa are often characterized in the western media as ethnic conflicts. In my experience, whenever I heard in the news that violence had broken out between two ethnic groups in Africa, my immediate reaction was usually along the lines of “Yeah, that sounds familiar.” I took for granted that ethnicity was the basis of the conflict without a second thought. But after doing the readings for this week, it is apparent that, as Eghosa E. Osaghae and Rotimi T. Suberu state, ethnic diversity is not a sufficient condition for conflict. Thus, the question that this raised for me was: are conflicts that are characterized as ethnic conflicts truly ethnic conflicts?

            The answer to this seems to be yes and no. The answer to whether genocide is a true ethnic conflict seems to be a clear yes, such as the cases of the 1972 genocide in Burundi and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. It is hard to characterize a genocide as any thing other than an ethnic conflict considering that the definition of genocide is the deliberate elimination of another group of people based solely on their ethnicity. Yet the answer is more complex: the readings convincingly demonstrate that ethnicity has been manipulated for political purposes across the whole of the continent, first by European colonial powers as part of a divide and conquer strategy of domination and later by post-colonial faction leaders in order to secure their own military and political power in a given territory.

            In cases where ethnicity has been politicized, such as in South Sudan, branding the conflict as an ethnic one is problematic in that it misrepresents what the conflict is truly about. It distracts from the real causes of the conflict and, if mediators are trying to treat a symptom rather than a cause of the conflict, it can harm efforts to find an end to the violence.

            While Osaghae and Suberu assert that ethnic diversity is not a sufficient condition for conflict, they do say that it is a necessary condition for conflict. I do not agree with this statement. It is an oversimplification to claim that conflict cannot occur without ethnic diversity. There are a multitude of different types of conflict that have nothing to do with ethnicity, such as gender-, religious-, and class-based conflicts. Or what about conflicts within an ethnic group? Presumably a conflict of this nature would be non-ethnic. It is probably better to say that ethnic diversity often plays a role in African conflicts, but it is hardly necessary.

            In the other article by Osaghae that was assigned this week, he argues for state reconstitution based on positive ethnicity. I appreciate the idea that ethnicity does not have to be a negative thing and that too often it is stigmatized as such. Yet using ethnic development units that possess a great degree of autonomy as building blocks of the state could be a doubled-edged sword. Since these units are based on ethnicity, they could reinforce an individual’s or a group’s ethnic identity instead of developing a national identity. Reinforcing ethnic identity is possibly problematic, especially given the autonomy these units would have, because it could lead to a culture of exclusivism and at its most extreme to demands of separatism. Without something binding these ethnic units to the state they would have less and less reason to be submissive to the state as they develop since they would be carrying out the traditional tasks of the state on their own. Moreover, if these ethnic units did reinforce ethnic identity over a national identity, someone could abuse it for their own political power, ending up in a situation where the state is being challenged once again based on politicized ethnicity.

            The last topic I would like to touch on is reconciliation between the Hutu and the Tutsi in the Great Lakes region. René Lemarchand suggests that there can be no peace in this region until the tasks of “shedding light on the circumstances, the scale, and the consequences of the” genocides in 1972, 1994, and 1996-1997 are taken seriously. Yet it is not just truth that is essential to this process, Lemarchand suggests that justice must accompany it hand in hand for peace and stability to be achieved. In an ideal world I would agree with Lemarchand’s sentiment. But in the case of the Hutu and the Tutsi both sides seem to view the situation as zero-sum. This explains why justice has been pursued without reconciliation in Rwanda, as those in power can certainly seek justice, but they have no incentive to seek reconciliation. In fact, neither side wishes to reconcile, each side wants to win out over the other. Lemarchand demonstrates this when he discusses the reaction to the Detmold Confession, how it sparked debate over whether the Hutu or the Tutsi “should bear the onus of guilt,” which was not at all the intention of the document.

            In light of this, I am not sure there can be reconciliation between the Hutu and the Tutsi until their respective mentalities change. But how does one engineer this change in a such an ingrained mentality? Perhaps fostering a national identity over an ethnic identity could help. Or increasing the integration of the two ethnic groups, as I think a person is less likely to hate a certain group of people if they grow up around them. A power-sharing government between Hutu and Tutsi could also set an example for the rest of the country. General amnesty for the “little fish” of the genocides could also help the two communities to move on from the events of 1972, 1994, and 1996-1997. Of course, all of these suggestions would be challenging to implement given the complexity and historical burden of the conflict, and they would require buy in from the communities. In fact, a power-sharing government in Rwanda has already been tried in and has failed. The only certainty is that there is no simple fix in attempting to reconcile two ethnic groups following a genocide.

Ethnicity_Reflection Memo

In this class memo I will be focusing on the ethnicity and ethnic problems in connection to the colonization and decolonization while trying to summarize main points and arguments from the class and also introduce some other ideas from my point of view. I would like to also mention how particular issues related to ethnicity and ethnic problems can be possibly overcome.

More than half of all African countries have experienced at least a year of armed conflict which usually tends to last many years before peace is restored. And almost all of them have some ethno-regional character what makes them even more complex and widely not understood. The one of the reasons is maybe the fact that those conflicts are in generally labeled as “ethnic conflict” without no clear explanation how is “ethnicity” perceived and what actually makes the conflict ethnic and not for instance conflict between rich class and poor class.

As a result, ethnicity is often connected to negative connotations as a catalyst for long-lasting and destructive conflict. There is also a popular opinion that it is something socially constructed, invented or created – just an illusion created by human imagination. Of course, it can be true to some measure but they are also decidedly real. Even before colonialism which is often blamed for ethnic conflicts, some parts of Africa had what may be described as ethnic polities – political societies with governmental institutions in a local space where territoriality and ethnic identity roughly coincided. Ethnic groups are actual people that are united in consciousness of their common identity even though it has not to be as coherent as we imagine it from European perspective.

Colonialism cannot be blamed for ethnic problems. This can sound as a simplified apology and justification of states that were involved in the colonial activities. However, colonialism was a critical moment and an early source of political ethnicity. All colonial administration relied to some degree on indigenous structures what to a great extent altered power relations within traditional power structures. Furthermore, it also induced intense political competition among ethnic groups. It was for the first time when African people where subjected to some artificially created political units and territories so it had to bring some further implications for African continent. Those boundaries were drawn with little or no consideration to the actual distribution of indigenous ethno-cultural groups. European powers undermined long-standing patterns of social organization and authority and they distributed “benefits” unevenly across ethnic groups. It led to the situation where some elite was able to capture control of the state and assert its hegemony within the post-colonial state while other subordinate groups were less able to develop either the political leaders or the organizational capacity to mobilize their members for any kind of collective action.

As it was mentioned in the class, this systematic division can be called thick and thin ethnicity where thick ethnicity is comprehensive one that organizes a great deal of social life and thins ethnicity represents less comprehensive group that organizes little of social life and action. This kind of division cannot really function from the long-term point of view. Societies and ethnic groups are dynamic units that are constantly developing and changing what can eventually lead to the undesirable clashes of thick and thins ethnicities. 

The second critical moment came with decolonization in the post-colonial era. For the most part, the nationalist leaders who came to power in Africa inherited the colonial state instead of transforming it in accordance with the democratic aspirations of the nationalist movement. Eventually, the post-colonial state became more violently repressive what just accentuated political ethnicity as the image of a hostile and threatening state. After this it could seem that ethnic groups just became purely interest groups while competing with each other.

But ethnicity itself does not generate conflict and is not threatening in its nature. During the lecture, an interesting argument was introduced and thus that ethnicity is being used in order to manipulate some group of people so they can serve to some selfish political purposes. In this case, are not ethnic problems only problems of a particular political dynamics which just happens to be pinned on ethnicity?

“Ethnic rhetoric” works mostly for politicians who wants to survive or to conceal exploitative practices by building solidarities across class lines and many ordinary people therefore give their loyalty to the local community or the ethnic group for very good reasons. So the conflicts where are the ethnic groups just misused should not be identified as “ethnic conflicts” as they are usually deeply rooted in political aspirations of some individuals.

So how can be overcome ethnic conflicts and negative connotations that are related to the ethnicity? Firstly, it is necessary to stress out that ethnicity has been a major element of political pluralism in Africa and it should be perceived as the best defense against the totalizing tendencies of the post-colonial state. Of course, the mixture of ethnic groups can live peacefully only when it is well-governed. For instance, in Nigeria a competition among ethnic groups contributed to human rights and democracy. Another point that could help to overcome all those problems is economic development that put an emphasis on political harmony and cooperation among the ethnic groups. On the other hand, it cannot be applied to every case as some scholars suggest. Economic development can very easily lead to the economic growth that won’t be equally distributed and therefore will cause problems and misunderstanding in the society.

However, I think that some changes should be done in the discourse about ethnic conflict itself. Sometimes labeling and simplifying those conflicts can cause the same damage as the direct violence. Ethnicity itself is not a security threat to a country but the particular circumstances, poverty and other factors are. Weak and failing state structures are the elements that make ethnic groups violent and angry. The question is then what is the way of transforming such a state without causing wide ethnic clashes among the population?   

Ethnicity_Reading Memo

In my memo, I firstly summarize all four required readings which were dealing with issue of ethnicity and identity politics in particular African states or generally in whole Africa. I will provide thoughts and insights of these authors as well as their opinions. I will be focused mainly on the ones I considered as indeed important and interesting. I will also provide my own proper views and questions.

The first article by E. Osaghae and R. Suberu: A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria was dealing with case study of Nigeria. Authors started their article by describing Nigeria as „deeply divided state“ (Osaghae, Suberu, 2005, 4) and de facto one of the most divided in Africa which was struggling with state cohesion, legitimacy, stability and democratization for years. However, they already at the beginning highlighted that „diversity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict.“ (Osaghae, Suberu, 2005, 5) In my opinion, this is very essential idea and they emphasized it various times. Authors also provided the comparison of the most diverse countries which are stable as Switzerland, Belgium, Malaysia with the least diverse that are indeed violent such as Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi. Based on this, they posed important questions. They tried to found out what are the major identities and how they could become politically salient and what are the Nigerian conflicts and how they are managed.

Thus, authors were firstly focused on concept of identity and examined its diversity in case of Nigeria. They described various concepts which try to understand and explain this concept and they concluded that identities are constructed, not pure but inter-connected and mutually influencing and depend on situation. They could be also firstly dormant and then active (for example, gender). And also neutral or politicized. The three main ethno-regional identities are Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. Then there are also ethno-religious identities, Muslims mainly in North and Christians in South. Other important distinction is between „indigenes“ and „migrants“ or „settles“. Authors mentionned also new identities such as class, gender, youth. However, the strongest and most important identity for Nigerians tend to be ethnicity. Authors were dealing separately with all these various identities and I indeed like how they showed that there are many other sub-identities and also intra-group struggles. On the notion of new identities, they revealed how identities are fluid and still constructed.

Then they explained how colonial time and legacy influenced ethnicity, violence and stability in Nigeria. Mainly British strategy of divide and rule as well as strategy of distinction between privileged and marginalised groups. British also influenced regionalism when they divided Nigeria into three regions. This led to various conflicts which were mismanaged. I indeed liked the structure of the text and the way how authors were explaining particular phenomena and issues to make the distinction clear.

I think that the second article by S. Hutchinson: A Curse from God? Religious and political dimensions of the post-1991 rise of ethnic violence in South Sudan could be summarized by the first sentence of its introduction : „A political movement´s strenght is limited by the clarity of its objectives.“ (Hutchinson, 2001, 307) because the cause of the violence and fighting in South Sudan was split of the Sudan People´s Liberation Army (SPLA) into two faction in 1991. This led to inter and intra-ethnic fighting. SPLA was divided under the rule of two men – Dr John Garang, a Bor Dinka and Dr Riek Machar, a Nuer. Author described how SPLA emerged and then split and what were consequences. He classified it into four stages which made his analyses well understandable.

I indeed liked how he also explained the perception and views of ordinary people. The notion of „lightning victims“ as a special category of spirit was really interesting for me. However, this perception was later disrupted by Machar which distinguished „government wars“ and „homeland wars“ and de facto prohibited these  traditional habits of people connected with death. In case of South Sudan, author revealed that the cause of violent ethnic conflict was not ancient tribal hatreds or disputes but just two men, two leaders who made people fighting each other. According to various quotes of ordinary people that author provided, also Sudanese people viewed the conflict as not theirs. This desperate situation was strenghtened also by fatalistic attitude of people which started to understand war as God´s punishment. And I think this is the most tragical fact.

The third article by Lemarchand: Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide? was really interesting and special for me. It was focused on case of Hutu and Tutsi and the most important question posed by author was who were real genocidaires and who were real victims of genocide. I read about Rwanda and its infamous genocide various times and it seemed to me that it is quite clear and obvious who are victims. I have never come across similar article who tried to analyse the whole conflict between Hutu and Tutsi deeper and go into history before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

Author described the important events which de facto led to genocide in 1994. He mainly highlighted importance of so called forgotten first genocide which occured in 1972 in Burundi when Tutsi started mass killings and violence against Hutu. This partly explained attitudes and behaviour of Hutu in Rwanda. Killings were repeated after assasination of Ndadaye which was seen by Hutu as recall of 1972 events and they started to persecute Tutsi. However, then there was brutal repression of Hutu by Tutsi army. Vast numbers of people had to leave and seek refuge. And many of them just in Rwanda. Author was then dealing with issue of how to heal and reconcile the society, how to overcome violence and myths. I indeed liked this article because it showed how myths could be created and how important events and facts could be easily forgotten.

The last article by E. Osaghae: Ethinicity and the State in Africa is dealing with issue of ethnicity and identity in general terms. He posed important questions whether the multiethnicity means instability of state and whether federalism is only possible solution for such state. Author also distinguished different concepts – ethnic group, tribe, nation which tend to be applied in wrong way. Then he focused on the question of state building and ethnicity and why is ethnicity so important for African states´ organization. He stated three reasons: competition between needs and demands of state and the ones of ethnic group; use of ethnic principle in process of postcolonial state construction and similarities of mismanagement of ethnic question between colonial and post-colonial state. Author explained that ethnic conflicts have their roots in colonial times and were caused mainly by colonial policy which divided society between privileged and marginalised groups. Then he examined the mismanagement of ethnic question which is according to his opinions caused by purely elite management which is not sufficient. Author also dealt with the issue of state reconstruction and the role that ethnicity could play in this process.

All of these articles provided interesting insights into the issue of ethnicity. All of them were dealing with colonialism as source of ethnic conflicts. I thus agree that ethnicity is in many cases socially constructed concept. I would like to ask whether society can overcome ethnic divisions between groups or is ethnicity today essential and stable part of people´s identity. How should multiethnic states deal with this issue? Is federalism and power-sharing the only option? I think that examples of Switzerland and similar states are not suitable for African countries because their history, development and current situation are indeed different and special. I think that we should be focused rather on issues such as poverty and underdevelopment which could lead to transformationa and maybe also reconciliation of diverse parts of society. These are the real causes of conflicts and I think that ethnicity is simply misused.

Ethnicity_Reflection Memo

The most beautiful city in Nigeria is a city called Jos. It is located on a Plateau about 1000m above sea level. This gives it a scenic landscape, beautiful weather, amazing food. Before 2015 when I started my masters program in Glasgow, Scotland, I had spent 12 years in this city, I was almost a locale. Sadly though, it is not for this reasons that Jos makes the news. The city has been at the epicentre of ethnic and sectarian violence since 2001. Scores of lives have been lost, property destroyed, families torn apart, scars that may never heal. As I reflect on the topic of ethnicity and identity politics in Africa, I cast a sober reflection to this lovely city that has been ruined by ethnicity and identity politics. It immediately becomes obvious the attending implications for development and security on the continent. For the purpose of this paper, I intend to use my experience and knowledge of this city as a case study to highlight some of the issues raised in the class. I immediately acknowledge that it may not have the trappings of a high sounding academic paper especially on the issues of objectivity and empirical research, however, I am sure that one way or the other the study of African security can benefit from it. Why else are we studying the course? Much said, I intend to keep it academic by focusing on two major issues; the first is a pending question that was asked in class i.e. why did migration in Africa produce different results? Secondly, I will cast a reflection on the instrumentality of ethnic affiliations during the decolonisation process. Now back to the beautiful city of Jos.

Origins of Violence

For the average Nigerian, like me, Jos is as close as you get to temperate weather and its features. Jos is originally occupied by a variety of ethnic groups including the Berom, Mwaghavul, Ngas, Bassa just to mention a few and Its location on a mountain range gives it access to some natural resources like Tin and columbite, hydrological projects, lush greenery, a gentle mix of temperate and sub-Saharan foods. Little wonder when the British discovered its existence, it became an instant melting pot of economic, religious and social activities, something close to an Eldorado. One of the first problems the British had was how to convince the locals of this area to be employed in the tin mines¹. To get them off their farms, the British used force (or the threat) in ensuring migration to the tin mines. They made sure that social and economic amenities were tailored to discourage farming, thus encouraging migration towards the mines. Not satisfied, the British made trade deals with the northern neighbours (Hausas in particular) to migrate south and get ‘gainfully’ employed². As a result of the religious diversities, the people of Jos saw this as an attempt to ‘gently’ colonise them where war had failed and were determined not to allow their contacts with the Hausas to rob them of their culture and heritage, especially their Christian beliefs. As such, they constantly frustrated attempts to be directly involved in the ‘activities of the heathens’. Over time, the Hausas soon built a socio-economic base and were able to buy lands and soon called it home. When the British left they were in control of the main economic stay of the city i.e. the mines and a lot of lands. Violence in this city has thus been a constant action and reaction by the indigenous people of Jos to exert their authority over the well consolidated Hausas. Also, as part of the decolonisation process the city of Jos was put under the control of the muslim north.

From this brief history of the city of Jos we can see that unlike in the western part of the world where migration was sometimes voluntary, in the city of Jos it was involuntary and vehemently opposed by the indigenes. Alien settlements have always been opposed by this city, so much that as a visitor you are told by your friends the places you can and CANNOT go because you don’t belong to a certain ethnic or religious divide³. This pattern of forced involuntary migration and settlement bears semblance to other parts of the continent  such as Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, areas that are well known for their incendiary tendencies. While I do not conclude that this is the one answer to the question posed initially, this form of migration induced violence between ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ has come to define cities like Jos across the continent. Most time the distinction is very blurry and is open to interpretation. For example, I knew people from a different part of the country but whose parents were born in Jos (and so were they) but their birth certificates are not from Jos and cannot benefit from certain rights such as contesting in an election in Jos.

This last point links to the decolonisation arithmetic that was employed in the societal building of the city of Jos. I agree with the Teacher when she said the decolonisation processes adopted by African nationalist leaders created a parallel struggle by ethnic groups on several levels. On one level you had the struggle for political power between the political elite and the colonialist and at the local level between the nationalists and their electoral base of nation building.  Responses from some students in the class attributed this arithmetic to the continents colonial past. As much as I don’t negate these constructs, I am of the opinion that the colonialist simply exploited the inherent, already existing animosities between the various ethnic groups to achieve their economic and political ends. The sad thing is, this is the same mentality that the nationalist employed in the closing phases of colonial rule and also to this day. I will highlight two examples to explain this point. The first is the constitutional quagmire of the indigene/settler dichotomy and the second is the pattern of urbanisation.

In a nutshell it stipulates that a person is only an indigene if your grandfather and perhaps 3 or 4 generations before you settled down there. This implies that you can live for years in a certain area and never be an indigene of the said place, you can be born in a place and not be an indigene. As such, ‘settlers’ tend to hold on to their ethnic identity because they are aliens even within their own country. In this regard, ethnic conflicts becomes self-fulfilling. This mentality was initiated by the colonialist but sustained by the Nigerian founding fathers, desperate to preserve their political base for the next election. Secondly, the pattern of urbanisation is reminiscent of colonial times. In the city of Jos, most of the mines are located in the south and colonial residences were located in the north of the city (close to the Hausa quarters). When they left, urbanisation spread north from south but left most of the British quarters in the hands of the Hausas. Subsequently, most federal projects such as the University of Jos (where I did my Bachelor’s degree), the city centre and markets are all in the north. Whenever there was an ethnic conflict, the school was immediately shut down because students usually lost their lives (I lost 2 very good friends, whose death inspired me to study a masters in international security) in such conflicts because we were usually caught in the cross fire. Also, the market (arguably the largest in West Africa) was the worst place to be in the outbreak of a conflict for obvious reasons. This system of preferential treatment in political participation as enshrined in the constitution and lopsided urbanisation may have been passed on by the colonialist, but it has definitely been perfected by African leaders for nation building.

In conclusion, like the city of Jos, nation states are constantly immersed in schemes with forward and backward linkages on how to balance out its ethnic complexities, an effort that is periodically punctuated by violence. Industrialisation, migration patterns, local politics etc. are a nice starting point for explaining the role, origin and impact of ethnicity and identity politics on the continent. But it shouldn’t stop there. The argument has to be taken higher to reflect current realities. This reflection has attempted to show that involuntary migration is one of the man reasons why the results were different in Africa. Also, the emphasis should be on the decolonisation process of the African states. 

Ethnicity_Reading Memo

After taking a non-cursory look at the readings on ethnicity and identity politics in Africa, it becomes clear that colonialism effectively set the stage for the explosion of violent identity conflicts in most, if not all post-independent countries. More than just that, colonialism setup huge challenges of national restructuring that would be required to hold most of these country’s multiple identity constituencies together in a single political community. As such, conflict management immediately becomes the stock in trade for most African countries who try to balance out conflictual identity formations and discriminatory practices. This policy of accommodation is a product of the 1963 charter of the Organsiation of African Union, in which the founding signatories to the charter proclaimed the sanctity of territorial borders. The principle of uti possidetis juris was invoked, proclaiming that the inherited colonial territories were inviolable.  The case studies presented in the readings provide an interesting case of i.) Insistence on this principle, in the case of Nigeria and ii.) Implications of going against this principle, in the case of Sudan.

Two areas of interest and points for further discussion I will like to raise for the next class are;

1.      Accommodation in ethnic diversity.

2.      Modernisation and its consequence for political integration in Africa.

Contrary to overly simplistic analyses of the implications of diversity on the continent, diversity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict. In other words, the very fact that a country has different ethnic, communal, religious, and racial groups does not make division and conflicts inevitable. As we have seen from the readings In the case of Nigeria, conflict management can reflect local realities that ensure mutual understandings of political and economic configurations. The Nigerians have been able to come up with various experiments on how to accommodate its incendiary identities. For example, the partial compartmentalization or decentralization of conflicts in separate, multiple, sub-federal arenas (rather than a few large regional centres), thereby reducing the capacity of such conflicts to polarize or destabilize the entire federation. Also, the promotion of some form of distributive justice through the devolution and redistribution of resources to multiple sub-federal jurisdictions as well the representation of diverse sub-federal elites in national government institutions, as concretized in Nigeria’s revenue sharing and “federal character” policies, respectively. Although far from perfect, these policies have gone a long way in maintaining the peace of Africa’s largest population.

This policy of accommodation is loosely rooted first, in the unanimous agreement across tribes to never repeat the calamities of the 1967 civil war which claimed over 1 million lives. Secondly, the policy is administered by constant negotiations in the shape of constitutional reforms, national conference reviews etc. these negotiations ensure that no unit is left out of the discussions and more importantly, no unit gets so powerful to distabilise the union. Incentives for units to constantly engage in these negotiations include political alliances (For example, the current governing party came into power by an alliance between mainly northern and western opposition parties and a southern leader), power sharing formulas (following the victory of this alliance, top positions were allocated based on the amount of support from the aligning regions). This constant give and take approach engenders a very intricate network of forward and backward linkages that tactically creates room for cooperation across regions and states.

Modernisation and technology in particular seems to play an extensive role in this version of accommodation. Technologies such as social computing sites have provided extensive avenues such as virtual communities (WhatsApp groups, Facebook groups and blogs) for voicing political dissent, opposition etc. against government policies. These communities more often than not cut across regional and cultural alliances thus dousing ethnic tensions that hitherto would have resulted in people pouring on the streets in protest. As such we see technology, in this case Social computing sites (SCSs) such as Facebook, Twitter, and blogs etc. transforming and enhancing the overall relations between modernisation and social phenomena thus playing a complementary role in political integration in Nigeria.

In conclusion, this fusion between modernisation and social considerations partially explains Nigeria’s relative success in crafting and reinventing institutions of ethnic conflict management and accommodation, including the African continent’s most longstanding and well-known, yet significantly flawed, federal system. It also raises questions on how this strategy is sustainable in the long run especially in terms of political and economic development. Also, the question should be asked, if countries like Nigeria with so many ethnic identities had the option of breaking up and going their separate ways, would they take it? This could be an interesting area for research.