African Union_Reflection Memo

The topic of this memorandum is the African Union as a security player. The African Union consists of all the African states and as such, it possesses great influence on the African continent. In this memorandum I would like to touch upon some topics that I find interesting, even though they are not very often discussed. First of all, I would like to explore the military interventions of the African Union, especially the 2007 intervention to Somalia. Second, I would like to share some thoughts on another aspect of the African Union: the policy to stop the AIDS pandemic in Africa, as I believe it is an important topic for the future of African Union and all the African countries.

African Union and Somalia
In 2007, the UN Security Council approved a mission of the African Union to Somalia, to help Somalia’s government fight the forces of the jihadist group Al-Shabaab. In the article Managing Donor Perceptions: Contextualizing Uganda’s 2007 Intervention in Somalia (Jonathan Fisher, 2012), it is said that Uganda’s motivation to intervene in Somalia was mainly the “desire to manage donor perceptions”. [1] This might be true and it is supported by a number of facts, including the fact that Uganda was the first AU country to send troops to Somalia in 2007. Most of the foreign soldiers currently present in Somalia are also from Uganda, so it is clear that the AMISOM is of high importance to Uganda.

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had a mandate for 6 months at first, but it has been prolonged since then and it is still an active mission of the AU. After all, terrorists are not really bound by the common rules or borders and could easily relocate to Uganda and become primary Ugandan problem. Being a part of the AMISOM is also quite lucrative as it comes with financial support from the United States and European Union (who obviously want to have a say in the future of Somalia). I also believe that by being highly proactive, Uganda is trying to establish itself as an ally to the Western countries in the anti-terrorist fight. Even though the article emphasizes on the fact that Uganda wants to be perceived as a donor state in this context, I wouldn’t completely dismiss the idea originally proclaimed by the Ugandan government that this military operation has nothing to do with the United States. Having an unstable neighboring state is not very desirable as criminals have their ways of crossing borders, so in my opinion Uganda’s primarily motivation to engage in the AMISOM might have actually been the desire to keep terrorism and crime from spreading onto its own territory. Then again, everything is complex in international relations, so wanting to be perceived as donor state and establishing trust with the United States probably played a role too.

African Union and AIDS
While the first topic I occupied myself with is a very straight-forward security issue, this next one is a much more social-oriented one. African Union doesn’t only engage itself in military missions, it also has other agendas. One of the most important agendas is, in my opinion, the plan to end AIDS and other diseases (mainly TB and malaria) on the African continent. I sincerely believe that stopping the spreading of AIDS is not something that any African country can manage on its own, but I believe that the African Union (as it contains all the African countries) does have the power to tackle and solve this issue once and for all.[2] The African Union has recently adopted a policy that promises the end of AIDS, TB and malaria by 2030. [3] I believe this is a step in the right direction, as Africa as a region does need further development in many aspects, but increasing the life expectancy and quality of affordable health care should definitely be among the top priority issues.

Summary
The issues explored in this memo were Uganda’s motivation to engage in the AU’s intervention to Somalia. I dare to concur with the article provided in the readings and argue that the biggest motivation was Uganda’s desire to prevent criminal spill-over from Somalia onto its own territory. Second issue I mentioned is the African Union’s steps against the AIDS pandemic in Africa. I tend to the idea of a self-sufficient Africa and in this aspect I definitely feel very optimistic about the AU’s plan. All in all, African Union might have its flaws (as we discussed in the lecture), but I do believe it is necessary for brighter future of African continent.


[1] Fisher, Jonathan, „Managing Donor Perceptions: Contextualizing Uganda’s 2007 Intervention in Somalia“, African Security 114 (2012): 422.
[2] I do seem to keep coming back to the idea of development aid and international organisations’ efforts to help Africa, which makes me think maybe I should write my diploma thesis on it. I apologize for pushing these social issues into my memos all the time, I will try to get a handle on it.
[3] „African Heads of State and Government define the future direction for AIDS, TB and malaria responses“, African Union, https://www.au.int/en/pressreleases/31184/african-heads-state-and-government-define-future-direction-aids-tb-and-malaria (downloaded 27. 4. 2017).

African Union_Reading Memo

How to maintain security and peace on the African continent is a question to which is really difficult to find a clear answer. African conflicts are very special in their nature as each African country has its distinct culture, history, beliefs and people.  The idea that the best way how to keep peace in Africa is that the Africans themselves should solve their continent’s problems has been a common part of political debates already a long time. It is important to mention that attributing a certain security role to regional organizations is quite a new issue in the African context. The regional dimension of conflict management remained rather undeveloped in the African conditions during the Cold War.

Since 2002 we can witness increasing efforts to unify politically (in the context of an open dialogue between all countries) all 55 countries on the African continent. The African Union (AU) was established in order to achieve greater unity and solidarity between the countries. It also identifies as its major components eight regional economic communities (RECs) with a peacekeeping and security mandate: IGAD, SADC, ECOWAS, East African Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and further on the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

Furthermore, a unifying platform called African peacekeeping and security architecture (APSA) which evolved in the late 1990s is connecting institutions and mechanisms functioning at a continental, regional and national level. Plus, the national level is formed by member states of the African Union.

However, as was mentioned in most of the articles. African Union is facing some major challenges when it comes to maintaining the stability and peace on its soil. There is a persisting dependence of AU peacekeeping operations on non-African assistance coming especially from the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. It is interesting to point out that this dependence undermines the key rhetoric principle of the Union’s approach to conflict management, which is giving preference to African solutions. What is more, in the military dimension, African Union needs to strive for the provision of a greater number of soldiers and technology to be able to conduct independent complex peacekeeping operations.

These facts should not serve as the main incentives to portray African Union as incapable of bringing peace to the continent. It is important to remember that the organization is still quite young and it is shaping its approach to different issues gradually. Nevertheless, African leaders must admit that broader and deeper cooperation with the United Nations is necessary for the further development. As the article written by Williams and Boutellis, Partnership peacekeeping: Challenges and opportunities in the United Nations–African Union Relationship, in some cases are both actors deeply divided over how to respond to the crises (e.g. in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire) or over financing the AU missions (e.g. in Somalia). But who should decide the best way of responding to Africa’s peace and security crises?

Cooperative frameworks between multi-faceted institutions all face the generic problem that agreement on general principles does not automatically generate consensus on how to act in particular crises. The UN Security Council has the primary – but not exclusive – responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, including in Africa. But there is the constant risk of creating inflexible structures, which can become redundant if powerful actors feel constrained and work around them to change the situation on the ground.

The peace operations that the AU undertakes are to a large extent a regional response to global problems. Most African conflicts are global in the sense that they are heavily influenced, if not driven, by external factors such as the global war on terror; the UN-NATO-led intervention in Libya; the exploitation of natural resources by multinational companies; capital flight facilitated and solicited by the international financial system; and transnational organized crime, driven by markets in the West and Asia for narcotics, human trafficking, timber and illegally caught fish. Effective African peace operations represent a significant contribution to the global common good.

But the AU does not have the capacity to develop multi-dimensional missions that can sustain peace over the long-term. This is where the UN’s ability to recruit a large civilian component in every mission and its predictable funding give it a competitive advantage. Hybrid missions such as the United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN’s support for AU missions like AMISOM show that a strategic relationship between the two institutions is possible and useful to managing conflict on the continent.

The problem is that the UN Security Council does not always respect the AU’s views. It is further exacerbated by the lack of a strong unified AU voice in New York. This is partly due to the limited AU representation, which lacks both a strong mandate and human and financial capacities. As the articles stressed out, the AU’s philosophy of ‘peace support operations’ is significantly different, in part because they are intended to address the entire spectrum of conflict management challenges as opposed to the UN’s focus on supporting existing ceasefires and peace agreements.

However, those different views and opinions should not be perceived as definite obstacles that would make further cooperation impossible. It is clear that the UN-AU partnership is driven by particular political and security circumstances that motivated the organizations to develop pragmatic solutions, and they did not result from a joint assessment of the situations or a shared vision of how to address them. I believe that the closer partnership between those two actors is not an option, but necessity.

Especially the last case of problems in Burundi show how weak AU is vis-à-vis its members. As an organization that on paper seeks the well-being of its population, the AU has not done enough in this crisis to prove its commitment to its principles. Acting tough toward Burundi would have set an example and demonstrated that the AU is committed to protecting the population of Burundi if the state fails to do so. AU action could have encouraged the United Nations and the international community to take strong measures as well.

With the AU's institutional and normative apparatus, Africa has one of the most advanced and extensive security architectures in the world, aimed at addressing conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as post-conflict reconstruction objectives. However, it is still far from being able to operationalize a true and effective R2P regime. To some extent, many of these constraints are common to other international organizations, including: hard bargaining among member states or issues of political willingness to intervene and contribute in terms of personnel and/or funds. In the case of the AU these limitations more than likely result from the fact that it is composed mainly of poor, developing and authoritarian states that are unable or unwilling to activate both the principles and capacities of the AU in the field of peace and security.

It is difficult to say what steps should be taken in order to overcome those problems and make the AU more effective in the security field. I think that African leaders themselves must make specific steps towards R2P principles and their implementation. Only then can be the AU perceived as reliable security players among others international organizations that exist in the international arena.

African Union_Reading Memo

The new policy of both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) embraced, in the early 2000s, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), notion about the conflict and security issues in Africa that can lead to different debates about its hypothetical efficiency. Indeed, if it seems to give back to the African continent it righteous place in the international relations, especially about the issues of the continent, this new policy has not so far proved a concrete and total success in the different conflicts and issues it had to faced.

• First of all, such policies and decisions from the African and regional organization is a good way to finally undermine the place and interventionism of Western and former colonial powers in the African issues, and then to fight the neo-colonialism and paternalism that is still going on in Africa between the former colonies and countries such as France. These new policies are supposed to give back to Africans their independence over the Western powers when it comes to international relations and security issues. However, if this new policy of Responsibility to Protect has been accepted by Africans, and even if it is still a recent modification of African organizations policies, different issues or questions could be already point out.

It is for example possible to wonder if the issue about the implementation of this policy within the continent will be possible since it seems that trust into these organizations is not effective yet. It appears that some governments could be more tempted to call Western powers such as France to help when the internal situation is going out of their hands, as it was the case for Mali or Central African Republic. This could be understand by the fact that France as a powerful state with military capabilities on the continent and interests within the country is more likely to react quicker and more effectively than a regional or continental institution that is composed of a plurality of states with all different interests and possibly less military capabilities – or a least less will to deploy enough troops. But the question is then, should the African State that call France or France be considered as responsible for the failing of the efficiency of the Responsibility to Protect policy in Africa? Indeed, if France is intervening for its interests and in accordance with its France-Afrique policy, the fault might not be totally on this country. We have the example of the intervention in Mali that shows a complex situation where France in the first part of the issue was favorable to a African answer to the internal conflict, and at the time the different African organization were already taking measures against the military coup and for more democracy and dialogue within the country in order to stop the conflict. If the main issue was probably here the military coup that blocked a concrete and rapid answer of the African organization that support democracy above all, and if the new Malian power had then no choice but to call France to help to preserve the integrity of the State against militias, France has also little choices but to intervene or loose all its economic and politic interests within the country, and did so as an answer of the Malian call. This intervention led then to totally fail the previous strategies of the African organizations but in the mean time helped to save the integrity of Mali as a state. This kind of complex situation does not really show whose fault led to the failure of an effective African answer to the issue and seems to prove that both France and the new Malian power were there responsible. It could then open an interesting debate about the question of the failure of the African Union R2P policy in the existing examples such as Libya, Ivory Coast, Mali or Central African Republic, to understand if it is the Western powers, the African States concerned by internal issues or a lack of efficiency of the organizations that led, so far, to no successes of the new African policy. 

• A second point that could be bring to discussion would be the organizational efficiency of such policy and the question of how and when it should be conduct. This aspect leans more on the internal process that lead organization such as the African Union or the ECOWAS to decide to act on the continent in accordance to the Responsibility to Protect policy. Indeed, if the new policy is very clear about when the organization is supposed to intervene in a foreign country and use force, that is in case of grave abuses such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, the organization seems to lack in capacities to act when more conventional instabilities or conflicts occurs in the continent. It appears that the Article 4 (j) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union for example, states that “the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security”. The UA is then, in theory, capable to take measure and use force or military intervention to help any member in an instable intern position but only if this country calls for help. But then comes a question, how the African Union should deal with conventional internal conflicts on the continent? If the first statement about grave abuses is pretty obvious – even if it concerns crimes that should be considered as graves and then should lead to an international agreement about what is going on – the Article 4 (j) could easily be problematic in the African context that concern also countries with a lack of democracy, whereas the African Union consider the democracy as the principal value to defend. Indeed, in the case of a member state with a lack of democracy and a regime close to an authoritarian stage that faced an armed opposition threatening the integrity of the state, what kind of measures the African Union or any other regional organization should take? We have in one hand a regime that could ask for help in accordance with the Article 4 (j), but on the other hand an armed opposition that is fighting to bring a better democracy in the country. If it is more than likely in this kind of situation that the regime use measures that could be considered as grave abuses by the African organization or just do not call for any help and then close the debate, we can think of a situation where both solution would be against at least one principle of the organization and lead to take less efficient measures such as mediation, that could push the government to ask Western power to intervene. It is then possible to notice that if the African Union or the ECOWAS decided to move on from the old-fashioned principles of non-intervention and non-interference, it appears that in practice, the hands of such organizations seem to be still globally tied compared to the Western ones and could easily lead to what already happened in Mali with the French intervention.

• Finally, another point that could be bring here for discussion would be to know if the complexity and plurality of (African) actors involved in security in Africa is helpful or an issue for the efficiency of the Responsibility to Protect policy in the continent. Even if such situation apparently never happened yet, it is possible to wonder if organization such as the UA and ECOWAS – and possibly the United Nations – could follow different interests, point of view or support different measures about a case of instability or conflict in (West) Africa. For example the countries of ECOWAS could agree on the fact that an intervention is needed whereas the UA could disagree on every measures. If the countries in the ECOWAS are also present in the UA, the differences between institutions as well as the other actors in the UA could lead to opposition between the two organizations and possibly then even more tensions and instabilities within the continent. A debate about the question if such plurality of institutions is benefit for the application of successful and efficient measures concerning security could then be ask. 

African Union_Reading Memo

The United Nations (UN) is a global authority in accordance to setting and watching over international norms in the area of peace and security. It holds the primacy in legitimacy for protection of peace. However, as challenges to security have grown considerably over time, the UN started to have a need for some complemental institutions which could help it to fulfil its role. At this point, regional or sub-regional organizations with observance to the same values accessed such possibility. In terms of Africa, the African Union (AU) is the primary regional body looking over peace and security on this continent. Application of African solutions to African problem is even showing to be beneficial.

            The UN is being criticized for its under-representativeness as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council do not include representatives of Africa, nor South America. This shows us the limits of UN global legitimacy. The feeling of being under-represented in terms of international peace and security management pushed African states to become active by themselves in this area. And as the UN got to know that it does not have sufficient capacities to cope with all of the conflicts and threats to security all over the world by itself, it granted the African regional organizations legitimacy to be active in this area. In fact, the UN (as a global level) and the regional institutions (regional level) are in a co-dependent relationship in the terms of legitimacy. The UN is depended on being perceived as legitimate body by acting in such a way that will be acceptable for most of actors in international arena. On the other hand, regional organizations seek legitimacy in the eyes of the UN by presenting themselves as observing the same norms and values.

For this point, Fisher (2014) explained the concept of so called image-management strategy, which was exceptionally well used by Ugandan Museveni´s regime. Museveni used this approach with a primary goal to maintain his regime. It consisted from creating and pushing three images of the regime towards external actors: 1) Uganda is economically successful role-model for other African countries; 2) Uganda is a guarantor of regional peace and security; 3) Uganda is a Western ally in the war on terror. This Museveni´s strategy was intended to make sure that foreign donors perceive his government in such a way that they will relatively uncritically support his regime and have good relations with each other. The strategy was successful, as the donors let the Museveri´s regime be, even though the same donors were in other cases asking some steps to be taken or cutting donations for other countries which practically did the same missteps as Uganda. Such donors´ approach of increased tolerance was indeed achieved by Uganda through making itself perceived as a valuable part of global security coalition. In the one moment when Uganda felt a decrease of its good international reputation, it acted by supporting intervention in Somalia. This step reinforced the donor images that Uganda created about itself and reassured the international community of its value and importance for international community.

The case of Uganda can make us wonder about whether the approach of international community is rightful as it is. Some could argue that the actions, or rather inactivity and conformity of the Western community/donors, is in such case undermining the system of norms and values that it has created. Was it really better for the donors to say to themselves ´it´s something´ and let Ugandan regime to do what it wants with so little reflection or criticism for its missteps? Or should Western guarantors of global security in similar cases be really critical without considering whether they are controlling and judging on their ally? Think about raising a child. If he does something bad for once, if he disobeys you as the parent, you do not simply reject him. You explain what is wrong, why it is so and you will not let him to do the same mistake again in the future. When raising a child, you need to both compliment him for good actions but also criticize him for the bad ones. Ugandan corruption, human rights abuses or insufficient civilian protection are not matters to be overlooked only because it is otherwise acting generally good (by being a good ally in security maintenance and economically prosper). Good long-term relationships should under no circumstances prevent criticism of country´s bad practices.

Another point from the readings which made me think was the question of legitimacy. Who is legitimate to deploy peace operations and use the force with the purpose of protecting security and civilians? As we know, the global guarantor and primary actor in security issues is the UN. According to the UN Charter, force against a sovereign government can only be used in self-defence or after an approval from the UN Security Council. However, Article 4 of the African Union´s Constitutive Act claims that the AU Peace Security Council has the legitimacy to deploy humanitarian intervention on its own in case of grave circumstances occurring in one of its member states (these circumstances are stated as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). Even though the adoption of this measure represents a significant development in civilian protection, it also brings us to questioning the legitimacy concerning deployment of peace operations. This topic only got concluded by stating that this issue of contradiction is noticed but it has not caused any real problems so far because the AU has not activated the Article 4 until today. However, I would say this is an important topic and would be interested in any further opinions and debates around it. How can we conform ourselves with something being ok because it does not bother us/is not urgent so far? The fact that the situation and collision of norms did not happen yet does not mean that we should not pay attention to it. It seems only logical to think about potential solutions and consequences in advance because this way is better than trying to find answers ad hoc in a hurry.

African Union_Reading Memo

The study of the emergence of the African Union and ECOWAS regional organizations and their relations vis-à-vis the UN are very complex therefore fascinating, as they present a intertwined system of decentralization, questions on the prospective role assignments, legitimacy and the ideal type of the future model of African – UN cooperation.

How did the UN shape the establishment of African security agencies? Did its commitment failure actually give space for the enfoldment of African sovereignty? I argue what the texts of Begrhlom and Aning imply: that UN ignorance of African security issues in the 1990 created a vacuum of needed peacekeeping and reconstruction operations that could only be filled by the increased activity of African states, who in response, preached for African unity to successfully deal with its security problems. Therefore the development of African peace operations was created by the weaknesses of UN responses in Africa, which, in cases such as Rwanda in 1994, hopelessly failed to maintain peace and prevent genocide. These institutional and system-wide failures inspired African led initiatives to deliver security. It is striking that it was the UN neglect in Rwanda that led to the establishment of the first humanitarian-related operations of the OAU. I argue that even though the operations of the OAU can’t be today regarded as examples of good practice, the African countries needed these first experiences, including failures, to drive at the point of the 2001 establishment of the AU. The chance of independent actions and lack of western interest led to the strengthening of the international position of African regional agencies and their role in international security.

Furthermore, I believe that the decentralization trend of the UNSC added the needed legitimacy for the AU and ECOWAS and proved their utmost importance in African related operations.  The AMISOM mission in Darfur is a clear example of how the continuous rising independence and importance of the African states established the basis of future UN-AU operations. However I tried to look deeper into the AMISOM mission and the challenges faced by the AU-UN joint cooperation. While the authors mentioned especially the legal frameworks of such cooperation and their possible challenges to legitimacy and future role assignments, I believe that there is also a large capacity gap when it comes to logistics, communication and interagency-cooperation. I find it very frustrating, that even after various successful operations by the UN in the past, the UN states are not ready and willing to provide the needed financial support to the AU missions, which lacks dramatically the technology and manpower. Furthermore the lack of coordinated training by various AU troops poses a challenge for effective maneuvering. The AU's lack of financial and logistical resources undermines its ability to lead these types of operations, while it is at the same time naturally the most suited actor for conducting these operations in Africa.   As presented by Fisher, can Uganda be an inspiration for other African countries to secure positive donor relationships and through that secure funding for AU operations? Yes, to a certain degree. But the emerging question for me is, why should be the donors help conditioned by such image building practices, which do not necessarily reflect the realities of the state and for which other countries might lack the needed capacities? While the African countries should definitely lobby their cause on the international arena, I argue that systemic effort by the UNSC is needed. The UN Security Council and AU should therefore establish a long overdue mechanism for financing UN-authorized AU peace support operations.

As the articles suggest, the goal should be the use of comparative advantages of the specific abilities of the UN and AU or ECOWAS and by this, establishing an ideal type of case by case problem solving. Comparative advantage is a major factor behind UN, AU, and regional cooperation and should be the determining factor in deciding who should lead what conflict, when and how-given their comparative advantage.  But as Williams and Boutelis note, there is lack of clear division of labor, no clear criteria, and there is no agreed decision making process to debate these qualifications. Furthermore the grassroots „cultural and ethnical“ differences of the UN and AU understanding of peacekeeping is a major factor that hinder effective operations. I agree that the old-school concept of the UN Articles is too rigid to address the specifics and dynamics of African security problems. I would agree with a stronger legal mandate of the AU in peacekeeping operations, as the UN poses obstacles that prevent the AU from actions that would lead to, in my opinion, better solutions. However the argument of possible precedent for other regional organizations in the world would in the future have the possibility of a chain-reaction, allowing other organizations to independently conduct peacekeeping operations. Does it pose a more generic question of whether the whole UN system should be reformed? Yes. But why should we stick to the current state of the UN system, which was established in years with clear cut interstate conflicts, when nowadays the world presents to us so complex, challenging problems, which ask for more complex solutions? While I agree that this is a very bold statement which probably disregards many connecting factors, I generally oppose the idea that elementary change in these systems is not possible.

African Union_Reading Memo

Throughout the years African continent has suffered and unfortunately is still suffering from many conflicts considering two Sudans, Uganda or Democratic Republic of Congo and other states and regions. That is why there have been many discussions on how to deal with all these conflicts properly to bring peace and stability to the many conflict regions within the continent. One of many proposals includes the approach framed with the title “African solution to African problems”. With these regards I would say I am starting to lean towards that type of frame, however, it often seems to me like “mother-daughter” problem when we consider the United Nations (UN), as a global peacemaker, and the African Union (AU). The Western powers or better in this case the United Nations permanent 5 members are not willing to let African states to lead their continent and deal with their problems claiming most probably the unpreparedness of African countries for such a role. One important fact why these powers do not want to let Africa go, as pointed out by Linnea Bergholm, is the interest-based cause and strategic thinking. These include most notably foreign affairs interests and issues such as migration regulation, mineral and energy resources, global war on terror or fighting the save heavens of terrorist organizations in Africa and many more. With this regard the “African solution” ascribed to the AU is certainly tied up with the term decentralisation.

In other words, when someone mentions decentralisation, it may also be translated into the debate over burden sharing vs. burden shifting. There is variety of factors that determine to what extent the actors, such as the UN permanent five members, are willing to decentralized or transfer some burdens to others, such as members of AU. Some may oppose the decentralisation arguing that the more multilateral the more powerful the international organization is. Or the more multilateral the organization is the more it works to avoid any „superpower“to dominate the organization. But does this really work in practice, particularly when we consider the permanent five members and their veto power. Also there is the question on the part of the UN and its credibility and legitimacy as the global actor when it comes to crisis management if it hands over the responsibilities or “burdens” to the AU?  From the universal point of view but some may argue the Western point of view the AU as a regional organisation with less inclusive membership lack the kind of collective legitimacy that the UN possesses. However, from the point of African states the UN perceived particularly as tied to Western interests and ideas lack the kind of regional legitimacy to pursue any kind of operation on the African continent. To put it in other words, the UN does not aim at “African solution to African problems”. On the other hand even African organizations and African states may not lean towards “African solution” and rather seek an international organization to deal with African problems or at least seek the approval of the international organization so the international legitimacy of the particular peace operation deployed could not be contested. This relationship between global and regional organizations has been labelled by Katharina Coleman with the term “the global legitimacy pyramid” on the top of which certainly stay the UN and its permanent five members of the Security Council.

As follows, I certainly agree with the realist statement that the international organizations such as the UN or on the more regional level the AU present kind of interstate platforms that server the interests of their member states. On the other hand, from the view of institutionalists or liberals these organizations also work as cooperation forums where all kinds of burdens are shared among their member states. In the case of the UN and AU the “burdens” to share may include humanitarian catastrophes, conflict resolutions or peacekeeping missions or more generally the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability and security as described in the UN Charter as well as in the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Cooperation between the UN and the AU on the African continent can surely provide at its best great opportunity to pursue such crisis management that would be most effective, most credible and that could serve the best the interests to maintain security, create stability and restore peace. Furthermore, in the case, as for example the crisis in Darfur, the AU can be seen as the middle actor. In this particular example, when the Khartoum government oppose the involvement of the UN in relation to the crisis in the Darfur region the AU served as a kind of “substitute” for the UN, of course with the support of the UN. On the other hand the cooperation can go also in a more negative way. The AU as the regional organization on the African continent should work and has been created of ideas such as pan-Africanism, solidarity and unity of African states. Nevertheless, the cooperation can make such ideas hard to pursue when we consider different relations between the UN superpowers, especially the permanent five member states and the member states of the AU. As it was explained in the work of Jonathan Fisher on the example of Uganda, in many case the perceptions of Western powers matters when it comes to many African leaders and governments. In relates mainly to development or humanitarian aid and various findings to support the economy of African states.

Moreover the funding also aims to persuade the African governments to cooperate in prevention of the spill-over of instability and insecurity in various forms such as migration, illegal trafficking of drugs or weapons or spread of terrorist activities and many more. In this way the African leaders invented or better used to their benefit a kind of a weak spot of Western powers. It is possible for them to exploit these threats which are in many cases over-securitized by Western governments in order to create cooperative arrangements with these governments that would best serve their interest and maintain their power. The fact that these threats present many times the highest agenda of Western powers works in favour of African governments mainly if Western governments from time to time oversee or do not raise critical claims against the practices of African leaders.

The African leaders are willing to support the over-securitization if it means that the aid and donor funding smoothly continue to support their causes and maintenance of their power. Otherwise, if the funding and aid would be cut by Western donors, they would most probably face an increase rebellion on the account of ordinary citizen or rebel opposition movements that would be hard to suppress without additional support. Moreover, I think that the Western powers just simply need to make these “donor darlings” such as Uganda and Museveni´s government in order to sustain their influence on the continent. In this way it may not be even the strategic image management of some African leaders that matters that much as the interests of Western powers to create such images. In this way they may simply find the way and causes to justify their cooperation with some African governments. With this regard the frame of African states made by Western governments is what matters, too, and it is created to appeal International community  such as may be the frame of an ally in the global war on terror or to appeal other regional states through the frame of economy success story.

African Union_Reading Memo

Kwesi Aning and Fifi Edu-Afful’s article deals with the role of increasing African agency in human rights and other crisis interventions in the recent years through the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Their main argument traces the shift in values that accompanied the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union in 2002. In tandem with this analysis, the authors examine the practices of the Economic Community of West African States in approaching interventions into human rights crises. The authors begin by enumerating the value shifts they observed in the transition from OAU to AU. Specifically, they address a shift in the foundational ethical framework from one of radical cultural relativism to radical universalism. This accompanies a concrete politicalideological shift from a sacrosanct respect for national sovereignty to what I see as a cosmopolitan constructivist approach to nationhood and identity among Africans. It also gives birth, the authors claim, to a “new pan-Africanism” under which common cultural identity as Africans ought to trump national (or sub-national) identity, especially in cases of collective security. The authors further assert that the impetus for constructing a new pan-Africanism stems from “a deep desire to revive a marginalized and exploited continent that has been ravaged by centuries of slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism, exploitation, oppression, conflict and hunger.” In this way they problematize the issue of African identity and offer both practical and moral grounds for the cosmopolitan endeavor. As part of the undeniably daunting project of constructing such a cosmopolitan identity, the authors point to the crystallization of the OAU policies of “‘nonintervention’, ‘noninterference’, ‘[in]violability of inherited borders’ and the sovereign equality of AU member states” into “new and widely subscribed global doctrines of ‘responsibility to protect’, humanitarian intervention, ‘responsibility while protecting’, and ‘nonindifference’.” This shift from an ideological to a practical foundation of the African community has been given the chance to prove its mettle by displaying agency and decisive action in several cases of resolving violent conflicts on the continent. The constitutive act of the African Union coupled with the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus lay the political groundwork from which the agency derives the authority to intervene on behalf of the safety of civilians. The authors draw a sharp contrast here with the OAU, claiming that the AU differs from it by providing an “integrated level of continental governance that could rival any other well-developed continental body.” The practical catalyst for this integration appears to be an interventionist attitude that has soundly replaced a doctrine of sovereignty. The criteria laid out for intervention in a sovereign nation at conflict include, but are not limited to, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The AU Peace and Security Council is the main body charged with analyzing and addressing these threats to human security. This security-oriented body has a civil counterpart in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance. Alongside the emergence of the AU and its governance bodies, the ECOWAS has increased its scope to influence security and civil affairs. In 1993, following conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS updated its peace and security treat in preparation for greater regional security integration. By 2006, it had adopted the Conflict Prevention Framework, facilitating the incorporation of R2P into its protocols. In this context R2P was delineated to include the responsibility to prevent, react to, and rebuild after conflict. Having addressed the regional security integration framework in place by the mid-2000s, the authors offer three fairly brief case studies examining the role and efficacy of African cosmopolitan governance institutions in conflict interventions. In Mali in 2012, after a coupe d’etat that placed an Islamic extremist group in power, ECOWAS organized an intervention mission that was ultimately absorbed into the African Union’s mission. However, before action could occur, France intervened as the former colonial power in the nation. In Cote D’ivoire in 2010, ECOWAS supported the opposition candidate in a contested election in which the incumbent refused to relinquish power. This support included decisively stating their support without hesitation and petitioning the UN Security Council for sanctions against the illegitimate president. The AU meanwhile ordered an independent electoral commission to swear in the opposition and established a high representative to oversee the implementation of the resolution, which was given a two week ultimatum for enactment. Ultimately the UNSC authorized a peacekeeping mission aimed at protecting civilians amid violent political turmoil. In Libya in 2011, during the Benghazi Crisis, the AUPSC devised a roadmap for conflict resolution that was ultimately rejected by the Libyan transitional government before the US and allies intervened to remove Gaddafi from power. From these studies we can see that as of yet the pan-African cosmopolitan agencies have not had any independent success in leading a humanitarian intervention. This should not be discouraging, particularly because the asymmetry in power between the AU and global and postcolonial powers such as NATO or France makes it difficult for it to act decisively and independently. The bold steps taken in the Cote D’ivoire incident may have expedited the UNSC decision. The steps taken in the cases of Mali and Libya also indicate compliance with international norms and a proactive approach to conflict resolution within Africa, as well as a lack of trepidation at violating a state’s national sovereignty when clear human rights abuses are taking place, as stipulated in their foundational document. My first question, therefore deals with the future role of non-African and post-colonial powers in resolving crises, which we can see in all three case studies. As the charter for the AU focuses on the traumatic experiences of colonialism, I wonder whether the future of African regional security integration should pursue more direct involvement, possibly with passive support from global or postcolonial powers, or whether continued cooperation with these powers, whose military capabilities are greater and among whom cooperation is more established, would be a more prudent path. As the construction of a pan-African identity is central to the social goals of the Union and as this goal is informed in no small part by colonial history, one imagines that taking direct responsibility for African affairs would send a symbolic message to the pan-African community that the AU is a strong and respectable organization. On the other hand, the cooperative approach towards former colonists is more practical, and this willingness to take a practical approach could also be a perceived source of strength, as instead of focusing on a symbolic independence from former colonists, the AU takes an authoritative role in assessing and condemning crises and takes the most expedient steps available to resolve them. My second question deals with the constructivist aspects embedded in the tenets of practical regional security integration measures by both ECOWAS and the AU, as well as the possibilities and limitations posed by the cultural-political side of the AU mission, which is regrettably not addressed at length by the authors in comparison to the concrete cases of integration. I specifically speculate whether the ECOWAS CPF should become integrated into the AUPSC. The two parent organizations have very different functions, but their securityintegration wings could face overlapping interests and bureaucratic roadblocks if the integrated security project advances successfully. On the one hand, the trust across all of Africa in the cosmopolitan platform could dissolve if there is a feeling that the Western economic bloc has come into a dominant position in the pan-African political sphere. On the other hand, shaping a pan-African identity requires trust building and pragmatism, so if ECOWAS is able to play a significant role in security integration, its integration, if handled smoothly, would do a lot to instill this trust. I also present a third question regarding the African Charter on Democracy. Advancing the goal of the cosmopolitan agencies from merely preventing and reacting to concrete human security issues to actual state-building in volatile areas would be a huge step for integration. However, the possibility to ignore sovereignty over spreading democratic governance could be seen as a step too far. I wonder whether it is worth the risk from a pragmatic standpoint, and whether it is justifiable or even feasible fro a political perspective. 

African Union_Reflection Memo

The aspects of our discussion in class that most provoked a response from me were on three topics. First, I was concerned by the dependence of the African Union and ECOWAS on international aid and how that reduces their efficacy as transnational organizations of sovereign nations. Second, the lack of open borders were presented as a major hindrance to the ability of these groups to enact humanitarian intervention. And finally, the persistent interference by former colonial powers can be seen as a limitation of the ability of the AU and ECOWAS to effectively represent African security cooperation. While I acknowledge the fact that these agencies cannot truly be effective until they can independently finance themselves, I remain skeptical that international aid is a massive hurdle to overcome. Especially ECOWAS, representing a massively resource-rich region of the continent with some of the fastest growing economies, needs to be considered in the long term. The foreign aid question is central to nearly all African issues, not just collective security. If any of these international agencies, representing sovereign states, is to be self-reliant, the signatory states must see the economic growth that can only come with increased sovereign control of their natural resources. Political stability and low fear of violence are crucial for economic development, and in fact the lack of stability creates a situation in which foreign economic powers have an advantage in negotiations simply because they can offer the private security necessary to guard their investments. So in the long term, continued cooperation with givers of foreign aid, though not ideal, is in the interest of regional security cooperation. This brings us to the second concern I had with the discussion. A lack of border security song the constituent nations prevents an open border situation like that which exists within (the majority of) the EU under the Schengen agreement. While this is obviously true, my take on economic development within African nations is that it requires greater internal stability and greater reliance on domestic firms to properly develop many African economies. Allowing for greater international commerce is also very important for greater prosperity, and I feel that increasing border security presents an excellent project for groups like the AU and ECOWAS, especially because it serves an objective good and leads to the contraction of more effective and self-reliant continental organizations, and is also unlikely to be supported by foreign intervention as it does not present a humanitarian crisis but is merely a regional integration problem. Finally, the role of former colonial powers, within the context I have presented, is not an inherent hinderance to development, but can in fact expedite the process of independent panAfrican or regional security and economic cooperation. If focus is placed on using international aid effectively and on increasing border security, former colonists may find that the investment pays off in the long run as African cooperative groups will be better suited to independently handle African affairs. At one point in the discussion there was the consideration of disbanding the African Union altogether because it is not able to effectively practice its stated goals. I feel that this would be a huge mistake, as an increase in the amount of bilateral agreements between independent African nations and foreign economic powers will continue to allow for low economic development except in very select segments of society and will essentially facilitate a type of modern colonialism conditioned by foreign government and private investment into developing Africa’s natural resources. I do not see any long term benefit to decreasing the level of international cooperation, even if it is in an embryonic stage. Finally, I want to address one topic that did not come up in discussion but which I retroactively feel should be mentioned, as it adds quite a lot to the resolution of the problems raised in discussion. The clause of the constitutive document of the African Union provides for the objective of spreading democratic governance in Africa. With a clearly stated political goal that reaches far beyond mere integration and mutual cooperation, the AU is in a position to actualize itself by creating and fulfilling political and social projects within Africa. Projecting a pan-African vision of society and culture, the AU has a long road ahead, but also present clear and tangible ambitions and parameters for how it will act. Working with foreign aid and even former colonial military might, setting and achieving goals should be the primary concern, with autonomy arriving later as stability, economic development, and integration all progress. 

African Union_Reflection Memo

In our class discussion there were quite different opinions about African Union and its role and efficiency. Some of my colleagues argued that African Union is not really efficient and more or less stagnant and rather full of dreams than full of actions. Even despite that the Africans have the will to perform actions related to conflict resolution, they are unable to do so from many reasons such as insufficient financial resources. Another problem constitutes the difficulty to agree on the proposals of interventions by all member states. The member states are very diverse, there are huge differences between English and French speaking parts, different regimes and different types of regions – all of that makes the possible missions very demanding to organise. One of my colleagues stated that this diversity is not necessarily bad and that it can help to find different kinds of approaches and solutions to various problems. My colleagues also mentioned the concept of responsibility to protect and African Union's criticism to this concept. They also talked about the shift from the concept of noninterference to nonindifference which is, from my point of view, very important and crucial for the whole African continent. The only things which were not mentioned in the class and which I find really significant and very progressive are Economic African Community of West African States' concepts of responsibility to prevent, to react and to rebuild which are part of the responsibility to protect approach and which are not usually largely referred to. I would argue that probably the most important aspect is the third one, responsibility to rebuild, which includes provision of the complete assistance for conflict resolution and, which is crucial, it focuses on reconciliation of all the warring parties and addresses the causes which gave rise to the conflict. In my opinion, without this aspect, it would be impossible to prevent another recurrence of a conflict which is not really exceptional for some African countries. However, I acknowledge that the possibility to conduct any type of interventions is very demanding since all African security actors have a limited capacity to act and they have to face numerous problems which are mainly related to sovereignty. Another issue, which was discussed in the last class, was ECOWAS and its achievements and if there actualy have been any significant successes. Somebody stated that ECOWAS could represent an ideal platform to mediate cooperation between warring parties and to discuss the possibilities of joint action, however it has not happened so far. On the other hand, ECOWAS did record some important achievements. First of them was the implementation of a protocol in 1979 which enabled the whole population of the sub-region (340 million people) to move freely across their countries. Second, in 1999 Economic African Community of West African States introduced first sub-regional security mechanisms in the whole continent which were established under the experience of ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group led by Nigeria, 1990s' peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and Libya. These sub-regional peacekeeping forces have already been used during the interventions in Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire or Burkina Faso. The third great achievement was accomplished in 2001 when a governance protocol was introduced. This document helped significantly with many democratic challenges in Togo, Niger or Guinea, it also largely contributed to the change of regime in Ghana, Senegal, Benin and recently in Nigeria. Last but not least, in 2000 ECOWAS created an innovative levy which was supposed to provide other financial support to the organization. Even despite the fact that this levy is not paid regularly, it helps to decrease organization's dependence solely on the external funding (Adebajo 2015). Another challenge which we briefly touched in our class discussion was related to the scale of the African Union's authority and whether it should or not penalize or, in the most extreme case intervene, in the cases of extension of the presidential term and whether this task should be expected from the security and peace architecture. I would argue that this issue should definitely be put on the African Union's (or any other African security organization's) agenda since this problem has been pretty widespread in many African countries and can even lead to violence and violation of human rights. However, in my opinion, this authority should be enforced as the last possible solution and only if all other alternatives, such as opposition's resistance, would have failed. One regional organization that actually has adopted some measures related to the prolongation of presidential term was already mentioned ECOWAS. It has rejected any attempts to manipulate with constitutions in order to extend mandates of incumbent presidents. In 2009 ECOWAS even imposed sanctions against former president of Niger Mamadou Tandja after he had suspended Parliament and then wanted to cancel term limits (ISS 2015). Probably the only thing that the African Union could do in the case of unconstitutional extension of the presidential term would be a legal agreement among all the African Union's members which would strictly restrict presidential terms to two mandates. However, this is not really likely in the near future since the decision-making proces in the African Union is based on consensus and because among the AU's member states there are still some presidents, such as for example President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe, who do not respect this restriction and therefore would not in any case support this proposition. Therefore the only possibilities to at least somehow restrict the unlimited ruling of some presidents would constitute of the African Union's limited tools of preventive diplomacy and early warnings, civil society movements across the whole continent, urging of the international community to the state officials and pressure from donor countries which could withdraw from the financial support to the countries breaking the agreed rules (ISS 2015)