Africa Representation_Reflection Memo

In this reflection memo I would like to focus on two topics, the first being the concerns aroused by simplified narratives. As I stated in class, while watching Kony 2012 I asked myself whether or not the film was even worth watching because of the way that the story of Joseph Kony is presented: as a narrative so simple that even a four-year-old child can comprehend it. At the end of the film, my understanding of the conflict in Uganda was no better than it was before watching it: poor. Indeed, Kony was not even active in Uganda in 2012, a fact that the film neglects to mention. Regardless, the class discussion raised an interesting question: what is the value of the knowledge that Kony 2012 and other simplified narratives present?

            The value depends on whether you are the presenter or the receiver of the knowledge from a simplified narrative. As a presenter, a simplified narrative is essentially a propaganda tool because it manipulates the uninformed into supporting said narrative. I must assume that the vast majority of those who participated in the Kony 2012 campaign knew only as much as they gathered from the film or perhaps slightly more from other sources that reinforced its narrative. Invisible Children generated millions of dollars for its cause off of the ignorance of its supporters. Thus, the knowledge from simplified narratives is valuable to those who produce the narrative because it benefits their cause.

            It is a different story for the receivers of the simplified knowledge. Without context and nuance, the knowledge that a simplified narrative provides is useless. For instance, all I gathered from the Kony 2012 film was that Kony is an evil man who abuses children, and for these reasons he needs to be stopped by military force. This is hardly the whole picture. There are very few, if any, black and white issues when it comes to security, and without understanding the grey area, no true comprehension of the issue is possible. The knowledge that a simplified narrative provides is therefore not valuable to its receiver.

            On the other hand, the point was brought up in class that simply knowing about the issue may spur further research into it. This is probably true, but there is a problem. It is not research that people will be spurred to do; they are more likely to seek out other sources that reinforce the narrative to which they subscribe. The 2016 United States presidential election demonstrates this vividly, as there were a large number of exaggerated and simplified narratives concerning each candidate. But rather than truly educate themselves on these narratives, many Americans preferred to find and share fake news stories over social media that reinforced their preferred narrative. It seems that people in general are much more interested in having their viewpoints validated than challenged. Hence, the value of simplified narratives to their receivers is extremely low. It might be better to be totally ignorant than to know half of a story or to be fed misinformation. It is clear that presenters of simplified narratives profit the most from them.

            The other topic I would like to touch on is Africa being portrayed as one country by individuals and the western media. First, where does this tendency come from and why has it persisted? Like most successful narratives, the tendency to represent Africa as a single country has perhaps developed from an already existing narrative: the colonial mindset that all African groups are primitive, backward, and uncivilized. Westerners have been equating African groups for hundreds of years so it is no wonder that they continue this practice post-colonialism and equate African states.

As to why this narrative has persisted, the western media certainly plays a large role in propping it up. All that most westerners see and hear concerning Africa in the news are the very worst situations that are occurring across the continent. For instance, the Ebola epidemic garnered massive coverage, while the peaceful, yet not without its problems, transition of power in Gambia this year was largely a non-story. This is not entirely the media’s fault, nor is it strictly an African phenomenon. When I turn on the local news at home in Canada the top story is usually a murder or a car crash. In general, bad news sells better than good news. Plus, it is more difficult to spark a viewer’s interest if the story does not affect them, as in the case of the Gambian election. Yet it is more than just the media. It comes down to the fact that it is very hard to break a narrative that has permeated western society for hundreds of years. More time and more education of the general population is needed to change the narrative, as not even a century has passed since the end of colonialism in Africa.

Furthermore, the characterization of Africa as one country is problematic because it can have negative effects on African nations and their citizens. For nations, it means that if a civil war erupts in one country the conflict permeates to all other African countries, stigmatizing them as war-torn. As a result, economic investment in an African country that is a thousand kilometers away from the conflict may be negatively affected. For citizens of these African countries, traveling or living abroad may present problems as individuals are negatively stereotyped. Many people automatically associate Nigerians with internet scams for example. In fact, I am sure that this represents the extent of the knowledge of many North Americans concerning Nigeria.

There is no quick fix to Africa being seen as one country, but the first step has clearly been taken: the assigned reading demonstrated that the problem has been recognized, thus it can be addressed.

Africa Representation_Reflection Memo

The main topic of the second lesson could be summarized into two words – simplification and deconstruction of dominant African narratives. The very first question that was raised based on the readings was if the simplification is really inevitable. Past or ongoing conflicts and problems in African states were always complex and somehow not profoundly understood by the people outside of Africa. It is difficult to say who to blame it for. Many suggested that actually mainstream media are responsible for producing superficial stories with negative connotations while providing only information which makes the story more interesting for wider audience.

On the other hand, nowadays we have easy access to alternative channels of information and alternative voices which can provide a broader picture of the problems and conflicts. Autesserre’s article about unintended consequences of dominant narratives relies particularly on the various local and foreign actors that are developing the alternative narratives to contest the dominant ones. But could they really succeed? Unfortunately, those not simplified stories can only hardly replace the narratives presented by mainstream media, politicians or NGOs. Because black and white stories are more probable to draw an attention and resonate among the audience who is not interested in the background or in the details of the conflicts.

Furthermore, in the relation to emphasizing “local participation” and local voices was raised a question who actually local is and what does it mean. Because even local people have their own points of view, own “agendas” that could also favor simple storylines and one-sided narratives. So to see and understand the complexity of the particular issue objectively does not mean to be local, but to be familiar with the all sides of the problem.

But the question is how far can this simplified story go? As we could see in the “Kony 2012” campaign, the aim was to make people know about the Ugandan guerilla leader, raise money and force the US administration to respond militarily to the internal conflict. It did not serve as an information campaign that should clarify the background and facts about atrocities that took place in Uganda. This leads to the dilemma which was stressed out in the discussion: is it worse to have ill-informed audience, or not informed at all?

The second discussed issue dealt with a deconstruction of dominant African narratives. First of all, many suggested that usually is African continent presented as a one entity. It means that in most cases neither media nor general public distinguish each African state as a specific unit with its own culture, traditions, policies and history. Referring to a particular state while talking about African identity is still not common even though we have many possibilities how to obtain real information that is not influenced by any prevailing narrative.

Some pointed out that the way how we refer to African state could be a legacy of the colonial past. This argument could be partially truth but the fact is that Asia was also colonized and we apply totally different approach to Asian states.

However, we can witness how dominant African narratives about mad African rebels, problematic tribal system, famine, violence, rapes and illiteracy became a stable part of NGOs' rhetoric. Furthermore, some international organizations accepted it as the only way how to present African continent to the audience and politicians in order to receive funding and grants. As it was also mentioned in the readings, countries have to deal with other serious problems but unfortunately, they do not sound as attractive for general public and governments as sexual violence or famine.

Power of framing led to the stage where complexity is no more accepted while creating agendas and projects that should help to improve particular region. Everyone is looking for easy solutions to the uneasy conditions. The great example of this attitude is also "Kony 2012" campaign - in spite of successful fundraising, it did not provide satisfying solutions that could bring long-lasting stability to Uganda. Instead of it, US president accepted US military presence as one of the best options how to secure peace there.

The question is then how can this be changed in the future? It is highly probable that people in general will be caring less about what they do not consider for being as immediate threat. It is not only in the case of African conflicts but also in the case of any conflict so far. The biggest change should come from the mainstream media and politicians that are shaping the overall opinion the most. Only in this case can be the new barbarism overcome.   

Africa Representation_Reading Memo

In my first memo I would like to find answers on two questions related to the Kony 2012 document and the situation of child soldiers in Africa. My questions are: 1) Has Joseph Kony, after the heavy campaign and international support, been already apprehended and is the Lord’s Resistance Army still active? The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was found in 1987 in northern Uganda and remained there until 2006 when the whole group left the country (Bareebe, Titeca, Verpoorten 2012: 142). However, it was already in 1994 when the majority of the Lord’s Resistance Army, including Kony, changed its location from Uganda to today’s South Sudan where the group received munificent support from the government (LRA Crisis Tracker). In March 2006 Kony and the whole unit moved to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) where they stayed for 2 years. During that time they camped in Garamba National Park and in May he also allowed BBC reporters to enter his camp and make an interview with him. He was also willing to engage in peace negotiations with Ugandan government which were mediated by the government of South Sudan. However, the peace talks failed and at the end of 2008 Ugandan army attacked the base of the Lord’s Resistance Army. However, the plan to capture Kony failed and in 2009 he fled to the Central African Republic (CAR) (LRA Crisis Tracker). After few again unsuccessful attacks of Ugandan troops, Kony decided to move back into Congo, however he stayed there only for few weeks and then changed the location again (LRA Crisis Tracker). In 2010, Kony moved into Kafia Kingi enclave which is a disputed area located on the border between South Sudan and Sudan (Enough 2013). Throughout 2011 and 2012 he was changing the locations of his stay quite frequently, he was spotted again in Congo and the Central African Republic (LRA Crisis Tracker). At the end of 2012, Kony moved back into Kafia Kingi where he probably stayed at least till early 2013 (LRA Crisis Tracker). Some sources indicated that the warlord could be staying in the Central African Republic (Human Rights Watch). The location of his contemporary stay is unknown. So far Joseph Kony has not been apprehended. Even despite the rapid decrease in the number of fighters of the Lord’s Resistance Army increased (in 2008 the group had about 800 troops, 7 years later it was only around 200 (GlobalSecurity.org c2000- 2017)) and the apprehension of Dominic Ongwen, former commander of LRA, in 2015 (International Criminal Court 2016), the group is still active which can be confirmed by recent actions committed allegedly by the Lord’s Resistance Army. From the beginning of 2017 there have been 18 incidents which included lootings and abductions od 77 civilians (LRA Crisis Tracker). 2) How is the situation with child soldiers in Africa right now? First I would like to define what „child soldier“ actually means. According to UNICEF, child soldier (in the terminology of UNICEF „ child associated with an armed force or armed group“) „refers to any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes, and it does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities“ (2007: 7). Concerning the international law, several conventions related to children associated with an armed force or a group have been adopted. The first one, which „set the minimum age for recruitment and use of child soldiers in international and internal armed conflict at 15 years“ (de Villiers 2015), was implemented in 1977. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) delt with the same issue. In 2002, Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict was introduced and it shifted the minimum age for recruitment to the age of 18 and also stated that only states were allowed to recruit. In the same year the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court, came into force. Under the statute the conscription of children younger than 15 during international conflicts or their direct participation in warfare was declared as a war crime (de Villiers 2015). Regarding Africa and the issue of child soldiers, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child came into force in 1999 (World Health Organization c2017). Among many other things, it is written there that „no child (every human being below the age of 18 years) shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain in particular, from recruiting any child“ (African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights c2017). However, this charter has not been signed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Sudan and not ratified by the Central African Republic (African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights c2017). Concerning the number of the so-called child soldiers in Africa, it is not really known, however it is estimated that around 120 000 children (40% of child soldiers in total) are used for fighting and other support operations (Rakisits 2009). In the latest United Nations’ report related to children and armed conflicts it was written that in 2015 there were 29 parties in seven African countries using child soldiers. These countries were Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Mali, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (de Villiers 2015). In CAR there were 464 cases of recruitment and 34 cases of abductions in the first half of 2015, in DRC 241 cases of recruitment and 108 cases of abductions, in South Sudan 81 children were recruited and 34 children were abducted, and in Sudan there were 66 cases of recruitment and 17 cases of abduction (United Nations 2015: 8, 10-11, 27-29, 31).