Youth_Reading Memo

In this memo I would like to focus on one of the recommended articles that I found the most inspiring, namely Alcinda Honwana‘s “Enough is Enough!”: Youth Protests and Political Change in Africa. This article is fairly different from most articles we get to read for lectures, as it is a transcript of a lecture given by the author at the University of Free State. It is also interesting, since the author mentions recent attacks against Mozambicans that occurred in South Africa, while speaking at a conference in South Africa. I believe this to be an important circumstance that gives the entire speech extra gravity and context. Everything is linked with everything.

The analysis is based on interviews with young people in Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia. Honwana shares three major points on the problems of African youth. First, she introduces waithood as a period of life between childhood and adulthood, where a person is simply waiting to become adult in the eyes of society (being adults by age, but not yet a full member of the society in terms of being fiscally responsible, having a steady job, family etc.). Therefore, while a 30-something old with no steady job and without own family is considered to be a part of the African youth, while a 10 year old that becomes a soldier or laborer is considered an adult. Honwana shares an observation, that while the people in waithood are often perceived as people who simply don’t try, it might not be completely true. Honwana states that these people who are “stuck” with their lives at the edge of adulthood are, in fact, trying to move forward, interact with their neighborhood and overcome the constraints of their surroundings and society. It does not help that the young people’s expectations are higher nowadays (they might expect better work opportunities, better pay, but they won’t necessarily be able to reach those, thus making them metaphorically stuck in waithood).

Second observation is that in the last few years young people are getting more involved in political life in their countries. The author blames this on the pressure that the society puts on the youth. Third observation is that while the youth movements can be quite powerful, they don’t have much luck with translating this into political power. Therefore, the author asks, how can young people in Africa get in the politics and change the political situation in their countries. She later points out the efforts of the young generation to change things through unusual channels, such as social media and the virtual world in general. On this topic, I would like to say that not everyone can go change politics in the regular way, but everyone can participate in social media. I believe the social media to be a powerful tool, if handled properly.

In the analysis, Honwana mentions that “men face the pressures of getting a steady job, finding a home, and covering the costs of marriage and family building. Although women are becoming better educated and have always engaged in productive labour alongside household chores, marriage and motherhood are still the most important markers of adulthood. While giving birth may provide girls an entry into adulthood, their ability to attain full adult status often depends on men moving beyond waithood.”[1] I feel like this should be explained further. Does this mean that in the author’s opinion, a woman is stuck in waithood even if she is a mother, has a stable job and is capable to provide for her children, but her husband/partner doesn’t have a steady income? This might be the feminist talking, but I don’t feel like the lack of a partner providing support has to mean that a woman can’t be considered adult in the way mentioned above. In a way I feel like a woman, who is taking care of her family by herself (or with minor help from her partner) is forced to be more adult than most. At the same time I would like to argue that being married shouldn’t be one of the criteria of entering adulthood. In the 21st century, marriage is not considered necessary by the young population all over the world and I don’t think that Africa’s youth is that much different. Provided, the societal restrictions might be tougher than those in other parts of the world, but I am sure that not everyone wants to get married in Africa. Therefore, rather than entering marriage, the criteria could be changed to a responsible relationship towards one’s children - you don’t have to be married to provide for your family.

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[1] p. 7

Youth_Reading Memo

The readings for the class on youth and violence in African conflicts were of very varying nature. Hoffman´s article reflected on violence as labour and made a case study of Manu River War for this proposed concept. Even after the end of conflict, it is difficult to measure how much the peace and disarmament was successful. Hoffman offers a new way of analysing combatants´ role in conflict. He argues that we often see them as fighting on the grounds of ethnicity and ethnic differences, but this is not always the case. In this particular conflict, rebels were identifying themselves as youth and differentiating themselves this way from elders. They did not hold any perception of enemy really. They even had recognition and identified themselves with their adversaries in fight. Hofmann showed us that ethnic identity but also national identity can be flexible notions. In short, for the youth joining the conflict and fighting violently, the war itself was their aim, their work, their labour. Outside of war, they had very little and unstable options of work. Opportunism and mobility became important, if young person wanted to ´se débrouiller´. According to Hoffman, we can understand conflict in terms of market, violence as a form of labour, and thus, money became the most valuable asset, standing higher than identity or nationality.

            Honwana presented us with a raising voice of youth that is being established in Africa. Frustration of young people on this continent coming from unemployment and lack of civil liberties started to be pushed through series of protests. We say that African youth are experiencing a period of waithood, which means that they are being involuntarily stuck between childhood and adulthood. This is caused by the fact that they are not provided by possibilities to fully become adults as they cannot afform to establish families, build households and became independent from their parents. Youth is therefore not constrained by age but by what a person accomplishes in life. The series of protests were many times successful and even emerged a wave of similar protests across the world. However, as the movements managed to overthrow a regime in the country (=attaining their aim), these young protesters struggled to give their efforts a valuable or reasonable continuity. Regime change is a start in getting a better life, but unfortunately, youth activists and their social movements struggle in formulating what they want. Generally, these young people seem to have a lot of energy in terms of acting in what they are angry about, but they don´t think in advance. I would say that making a regime change is such important step, that it is quite incomprehensible how these people can go for it without considering future steps. We may probably discuss this point in the class, and compare African youth activism with the one that we know in Europe. It would be interesting to find differences, or whether we have such kind of eagerness here as well. If youth makes a step towards change and overthrows an incompetent regime, but does not have a plan of what to do with it afterwards, it is only logical that this shift creates space for re-emergence of traditional politics. And as we could have read, this pushes the young activists back in the corner of political arena.

            Leonardi in his article highlights the importance of connections that exist in African families and how military and politics is perceived by public. Unlike in the article by Hoffman, we observed here that African, or more concretely South Sudanese, youth is not really seeking the violence by itself. Leonardi argues, that young people rather balance in between ´hakuma´ (representing the sphere of politics or military) and ´home´ (social sphere, family, community). Even though that the lines between these spheres have blurred over years, they are still there and youth still holds moral authority of their families. As pointed out, even though the youth tries to balance and not to get incorporated in neither of these spheres on a full scale, at times, young people are captured by the ´hakuma´. Having historical roots, even education of children is perceived, mostly by rural citizens, as stepping into the government sphere. But also, joining the military is the way. This used to happen forcibly, but also voluntarily. The latter was often only a way of how to protect one´s family, to spare its other members. In addition to this, Leonardi pointed out the importance of family in a young person´s transformation to a ´full person´, to an adult. For this, marriage was an important precondition, which should be accompanied by other achievements such as establishing household. But what is important, is the role of family of symbolic nature when it blesses the marriage. In this regard, I found two point a little odd. First, as the marriage is presented as a very serious, almost sacred value, but the author also describes the presence of casual sex in the community among young people and some kind of ´fines´ being paid for it, this does not make much sense to me. Secondly, the author explains that a way for youth to escape capture by either of the spheres (government and home) they aspire to run away to foreign countries. However, as we were presented with a portray of very close relations in traditional African families, which are still being highly valued by the youth, how could getting away and stop caring for their elderly be acceptable solution to their problems?

            The fourth article by Peters and Richards presented us various reasons of why the youth fights and joins military in African conflict. This was realized by nine interviews with former child combatants. This article was particularly interesting for me, as it gave me the sense of really getting into heads of the child soldiers and their perception of the conflict. These cases included young boys and girls who entered fighting voluntarily but also involuntarily by being captured. There were cases of educated and uneducated, or rural and city background. The reasons for them joining the fight voluntarily were varying from revenge (for killed or dispersed family, or interrupted education), to following a partner or family member. There were some, that would return into the war, and others which are glad they are out of it. Some drug addicts, some not. The variety in so many aspects that was given in these interviews was really interesting. The authors however do not make any concluding statements on whether we should perceive the child soldiers as evil individuals or victims. They let us decide. For me, I incline more towards the victims. Often, the children are joining the war forcefully, sometimes not even understanding it. They are deprived of normal life, of loving family, of possibility to make their own decisions on what is right and wrong. I would say that even when joining the combatants voluntarily, children often still don´t quite understand the horrific nature of what is going on around them and that this is not a normal state of affairs. Yes, some claim to enjoy the war. I would assign such claims to childish imprudence. But of course, other colleagues could have different opinions, which would probably be an interesting point to discuss.

            Lastly, Utas and Christensen wrote about ex-militias and their role in politics after the conflict ends, in the case of Sierra Leone. Right after the conflict, ex-militias members find themselves with very specific skills, no job, and being marginalized in the new political order. However, as times went on, these ex-militias became asking for being repaid for their services during war. As the new government was perceived as being the force which pushed militias from power, it is the government that has to repay them, that has the debt. First, in 2007 elections, politicians found a way to use ex-militias. They provided politicians with ´the gift of violence´, simply put, with personal protection before elections. After the elections, the losing party supporters quickly realised that their service is not going to be repaid as their candidate was not successful. However, the winning party supporters found themselves in a very similar situation as well. Some were granted jobs in Iraq, which they still found insufficient. In the campaign for the next elections in 2012, politicians expressed a shift in their cooperation and did not accept the violent services of ex-militias as acceptable. This way, they were trying to please both international community and local citizens who did not like ex-militias positions in supposedly new political order. They therefore decided to silence the violence, which turned to be even a weaker way to make their claimed services to be paid for. To conclude, this article showed us that ex-militias and politics is being reciprocally connected and they are mutually dependent on each other, whether to a greater or smaller degree.

Youth_Reading Memo

When it comes to a war different people develop and maintain different roles. With regards to civilians many may be involved directly in the war as fighters, be it voluntarily or forcibly but they might as well contribute to warfare indirectly through weapons production or distribution and so on. Unfortunately a lot of civilians end up as victims of war when they become homeless, displaced, injured or dead. If I think about the right cause, if there is any right cause at all, why so many civilians get in the war waging I have came across one basic idea. It is the idea of people throughout the war that if they would not take the position of a fighter or a worker in a factory for weapon production someone else would agree upon that position and take the job. To be more concrete this idea is closely tied to that one explained in the readings of Krijn Peters and Paul Richards who conducted various interviews with (former) child combatants in Sierra Leone or in the paper written by Daniel Hoffman.

To put it simply the idea described above can be explain by the fact that many combatants perceive their duty in the war as a work that earns them some living as if they were farmers or vendors but the war change conditions so they are now fighters. That is quite understandable from the rational point of view since everybody needs to earn some money or food, etc. to continue their lives.  In implies in my opinion generally to many people around the world and through different periods of time, considering the World War I and World War II, Balkan wars or nowadays conflict in the Middle East or to states in the African continent. However, what is pretty appalling is that this logic is applied also by children. The fact that children at the age of 9 to 18 and even smaller are capable to position themselves in such a role is really inconceivable to me since the logic to kill someone because it is a “job to do” is rather brutal even for adult soldiers. On the other hand as was shown via the interviews with Sierra Leoneans child soldiers provided by K. Peters and P. Richards there are also other logics that child combatants carry with themselves. These include land, family or local community protection, revenge or survival since if they would no go and kill they would most probably ended up killed. On different occasions they may occupy these from the beginning of the war when they join voluntarily or they might develop them throughout the time they “work” as soldiers when they are captured by commands involuntary. But once again these are also very strong reasons for any children to adopt and make it as their own and most of all to kill for them. Furthermore such logics also carry some emotional, insight meanings that are not usually elaborated by children’s minds as the idea to kill for revenge or to kill to survive. On the other hand fear and threats play certainly a big role if these positions are acquired. That is why it is quite hard to assess these logics when we applied them to children. Could it be described as brave or rather bad and depraved when a child wants to protect family or village?

Either way I agree that all child soldiers are “victims” of military manipulation and war robbed them of normal childhood, chances to education, family members, and their homes. And education is particularly another important issue as in variety of cases presented by the readings children expressed their frustration of loss of opportunity to educate themselves and stated it as the cause to go and fight. It gets me then to another picture in which children are either students or combatants. Some of (former) child soldiers introduced by the readings were attending primary or secondary school before the war came to their villages and many of them would be really like to go back to school again. However, it makes me to put questions there, which are: Why child soldiers admire education that much? What does the whole process of education represent to them?  What does it mean for them to be educated, to attend a school, to graduate? Besides the sometimes rather false impression of connection between being educated and having more opportunities on a job marked it main show that there are only two worlds for children who went to school in the pre-war period. I would describe it as a kind of a psychological dilemma that you either go to school or to war and being able to get back to school means that there is no war, no need to protect family members or their own lives because you are in a way safe. That kind of thinking would pose the education as an opposition to war in child logic which is pretty interesting to me.

Another significant point was brought up by D. Hoffman who wrote in relation the Mano River War: „War was something one does, rather than an activity one specifically undertakes against another” (Hoffman, 2011, p.: 39). This and other readings indicate that there is usually no enemy specified when it comes to youth violence and that rival combatants more or less identify with each other. They often share the same sense of marginality and political exclusion, and hopelessness due to social and economic inequalities produced mainly by corrupted and nepotist governments. In this way they actually share a sense of common enemy. Nevertheless in a war against each other they lack the logic of othering which would distinguish them from the opposing side and works as a kind of bonding procedure against common enemy. I would say this is another case when youth combatants become “victims” of military manipulation and as Hoffman puts it they become available as just in time production. Youth with no purpose in life, probably uneducated and unemployed is very vulnerable but at the same time very “flexible” when it comes to military or rebel commanders who need military “workers” to pursue their goals and interests. It is also the case of a stalemate of young Africans characterized as “waithood” by Alcinda Honwana. On the top of already mentioned despairs of African youth such as political marginalisation, is the sense of being trapped in the period between childhood and adulthood. It means that they are unable to continue their lives towards the state of being fully independent; being able to set up a family and being respected in the community they live in. However, one of the problem that causes the trap in this prolonged childhood might be that African youth is perceived to be able to identify only what they do not want or what they want to change and that is mostly corrupted and dictator leaders, nepotist governments and undemocratic regimes that they live within. On the other hand there is no collective vision on how this would be achieved or what would newly established regime encompassed at all. And that might be particularly the biggest problem which actually disunite the African youth and makes it vulnerable to rebel and military forces.  

Youth_Reading Memo

The issue of child soldiers is predominant in conflicts in African nations. This phenomenon produces many considerations for students of security, including strategic, demographic, and moral considerations. The study presented in this article is particularly valuable to gaining a deeper insight into the issue because child combatants are afforded the opportunity to explain their experiences for themselves. This is important because they currently tend to remain trapped within a dual paradigm, viewed either as victims of sinister adults or larger power structures, who would then bear the brunt of moral criticism, or as “vermin” or “barbarians”, often drawn from regional and class issues within the state; in the case of Sierra Leone, the impoverished interior supplied the majority of child soldiers, who were uneducated and poor compared to coastal elites, in part a social structure that is a holdover from colonial times. The problem with such a paradigm is that in both cases the children are more or less denied agency. This denial is done more strongly in the first case, as the critic simply refuses to acknowledge that a child is capable of making a rational decision (which I hold to be at least partly true). But it is also true in the second case, if only because such strong biases against the lower class clouds the critic’s ability to make a nuanced analysis of individual actors and to accept that individual responsibility is at least partly in play, not only structural conditions. I can conceive of no better way to break out of this dangerous and limiting duality than to hear from the individuals themselves. My reflection focuses mainly on the structural conditions elucidated by the under age combatants, which, as the other points out, stand in stark juxtaposition to the ignorance and oversimplification offered by observers. My first observation is on the prevalence of the Green Book offers by Gaddafi. The Maoist guerrilla tactics expounded therein provide a framework for unconventional warfare, including attacks on civilians and economic infrastructure, ambush tactics, and most importantly the promise of a clear political end goal as result, as the strategy involves the construction of a comprehensive insurgency which begins in the most remote regions of a territory and ends with full political control of the state. Such a radical and populist tactic is viable considering the overwhelming view offered by these underage combatants that their main qualm with the status quo was the disruption of their education. Considering the political favoritism showed to certain students afforded the opportunity to study abroad, it is no wonder that those denied such a privilege and subsequently facing a severe disruption of their lifestyle from civil war felt compulsion to engage in the conflict. In addition to these structural causes, the actions carried out by the state military in the 90s, which included special forces’ brutalization of civilians suspected of collaboration with insurgents, appear as a major influence on the decision of youths to engage in the conflict. Again referring back to the Maoist doctrine of raising a guerrilla insurgency, it is very understandable that youths in impoverished rural regions of the country’s interior were so vulnerable to radicalization. Given the limiting of their options in life by the conflict, carried out both by the revolutionary insurgents and the government forces alike, it is clear why the stereotype relating to uneducated and barbarous youths in the countryside was able to gain momentum among elites, though it is equally clear why such a mentality falls disastrously shot of comprehending the overall situation. Following the soft coup that occurred in the capital, the RUF/SL remained excluded from discussions on the provisional council that sought to realign the nation, the emboldening their efforts as a revolutionary insurgent body. Economic factors play a deeper role when we examine the limited pay and inadequate training offered to government forces, suggesting that siding with the insurgents was seen by many not as a politically motivated choice but as a last resort in the face of dire circumstances. In particular the exploitation of diamond mines, chief among Sierra Leone’s economic resources, created a dangerous brew of structural causes in which military targeting of civilians with eh intent of disrupting economic activity become the norm. While viewed from the outside simply as an egregious violation of human rights and conflict norms, the central role of such economic activity to the conflict can deeply inform critical observers as to the agency and motivations of underage conflict participants. Finally, looking especially at the 1994 systematic attacks on these mines, we become fully aware of the interconnectedness of economic activity in the interior to the conflict. The structural position many civilians found themselves in further informs out reevaluation of the rational choices made by these youth combatants. Overall, my reflection centers on two questions. First, how can international organizations, be they within or outside of the African continent, intervene effectively in a conflict with such egregious human rights violations while properly effecting change in the structures that encourage such conflict? Second, to what extent is the over simplified and flawed narrative centered on a false dichotomy of victims and savages responsible for inhibiting effective intervention? 

Youth_Reading Memo

The article “Enough is Enough!”: Youth Protests and Political Change in Africa by Alcinda Honwana brings some very interesting and, in my opinion, useful concepts that can help, at least a little, explain behavior of African youth. One really innovative concept is socalled „waithood“ which is the description for the period between childhood and adulthood and which is characterized by the inability of young people to find a job and because of that become independent and start a family. It is interesting to compare this situation with the situation in the Czech Republic. I would argue that there is no such thing as „waithood“ period, of course in the Czech Republic there are young people who are not able to find a job and move out from their parents, however, the difference is that the society does not perceive these youths as not-adults. In my opinion, the concept of adulthood in this state is rather connected with age than with the ability to become independent – therefore the opposite than in African countries. I would also argue that the perception of the not-yet-independent young Czech people is not so severe as in the African states. My point of view is that Czech parents are much more tolerant to the situation when their children stay living with them when they reach the age of 18, I do not think this is the same in many African countries. One reason for this attitude may be the fact that many African parents can hardly support themselves and therefore it is not possible for them to provide also for their children. They can even rely on some financial help from their kids and if they do not get it, their situation can worsen significantly. The author of this article stated that „severity of the impact of waithood on the lives of young Africans depends on each individual’s character, abilities, and life skills“, then she added that „it is also, largely, a function of their family background, level of education and access to resources“. In my opinion, the latter set of determinants is far more important for the African young people than the former. I would argue that even despite the youths possess great character and abilities, it is still very hard for them to become independent and get a well-paid job if they do not have the necessary education or support from their families. Also, because of the fact that in many African countries there is a huge level of corruption, it is almost impossible for many young people to get a job with good prospects even despite they have the needed education and skills. Therefore, it cannot be really surprising that some African young people are frustrated by this situation. They can eventually end up in some insurgent group and even resort to violence because the group can offer them the so much needed income. Another interesting, however not so surprising, point made by the author was the statement that African youth do not want to participate in political parties and prefer engaging in movements where the party membership is not required and also fighting through virtual world. I acknowledge that this form of involvement, especially sharing their campaigns on internet, can sometimes have wider impact than local protests and can draw in the so much needed and sometimes crucial attention of the international community (a great example of this was the Kony 2012 video made by Invisible Children). However, I would argue that these kinds of resistance are successful mainly in democratic countries where the authorities have to listen to the public and usually cannot afford to ignore dissatisfactions of citizens. As it has been proved several times, autocratic leaders often disregard manifestations of dissatisfactions because their only concern is to keep their power. Therefore it is almost impossible for the youth or citizens in general to change anything (however, I acknowledge that there have been several examples when this form of resistance have proved successful). Thus I would probably argue that in its local context the participation in political parties can maybe have bigger impact when there is continual and systematic pressure on the authorities which is supported by the votes of the citizens (again, this does not apply to the cases where there is no political competition). Another very interesting and in some ways eyes-opening article was 'Why We Fight': Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone by Krijn Peters and Paul Richards in which the authors conducted several interviews (not only but predominantly) with Sierra Leonean child soldiers fighting on the side of governmental Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force, on the rebels side (The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone) and also on the side of Kamajo militias. The authors offered the readers an unique insight into the motivations of child soldiers and questioned probably the most common perception of child soldiers who are, at least in my opinion, very often perceived only as victims abducted by different fighting groups and used as fighting force against they will. The authors challenged this position through several interviews which they conducted. However, they did not make any conclusions in their article and explicitly stated that the „purpose of this article is to let young combatants explain themselves“ and that „the reader is left to decide whether they are the dupes and demons sometimes supposed“. However, after reading all the interviews, it cannot be easily said and concluded that all the children are „demons“ or „victims“. It would be a great mistake to generalize all the cases since all the children had different motivations. We can definitely find an example of a kid who could be described as a „demon“ (interviewee number 4) and also a clear example of a „dupe“ (interviewee number 3). Another thing that was really interesting about the article was that the authors showed that not all the child soldiers come from poor, rural and uneducated families, as many people would think. The clear example of this misperception was the interviewed girl in the second interview who volunteered as a soldier and who came from very supportive family and had a good level of education. 

Youth_Reading Memo

The widespread violence among the young population is one of the main challenge that African States have to face within their borders. From some readings, emerged that the most common kind of violence in Africa is, according to some scholars, characterized largely by bodily violence of small arms and direct physical confrontation. I found the readings for this lesson interesting, especially the article in which the author, Hoffman, talks about violence in the so-called Mano River War’s context. He used this term to report the violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1989 and 2003, as examples of the inextricable connection between the young population and violence. Hoffman also pointed out some parallels between the military activities and their links to the world economy, for example the smuggling of diamonds in West Africa or other illicit activities. A link between fighters and the world economy is something that is also showed by the perception of those young fighters of seeing themselves as workers. Therefore, for better understand the dynamics of the violence in the African continent; I think we should take into account in our discussion the suggestion of the author, and so seeing the violence as a literal work. (Hoffman, Cultural Anthropology, 2011)

It is quite interesting that the use of violence is linked to the identity. Indeed, it can be used to put ourselves in a relationship with the others and the social borders, but in a wrong perception that lies upon the idea of a confrontation with someone different from us, that can easily become the enemy, assuming all the characteristics of an “enemy”. The same is true for the violence in Africa within opposite rebels group for example. Regarding Goffman’s article, my question is the following: is it possible seeing as he said, «the violence young men in the region’s militia movements performed as a mode of post-Fordism»?

Some other questions came up to my mind while I was reading the other texts. Firstly, where and what is the origin of the violence? Are just poverty, unemployment, economic difficulties, political oppression, absence of civil liberties the main reasons behind the widespread violence in Africa, or there is something else that affects this dynamics? These are for sure reasons to have in mind, as long as are all interrelate phenomenon, as we can easily envisaged from the generation’s struggles for economic, social, and political emancipation. It is here interesting what said another author, Honwana, about this last point. Precisely, he affirmed that the African youth are living in the “waithood”, meaning that they are in the between among the childhood and the adult-age, so they are waiting for adulthood but actually, they are not able to do step forwards because they cannot afford certain livelihoods, or because they are excluded from socioeconomic institutions and political processes. The recent economic growth could bring some benefits, but as noticed by the author, without equity in wages and human rights among the populations, it will be hard for people, especially the young ones to live as they want, as well as their the right to live a good life in the respect of the others. A real transformation requires no hurry and time in order to achieve some goals; otherwise, violence will remain one of the main issue at stake without solving the problems.

Another data to bear in mind is that nowadays, young Africans are generally better educated and more connected with the rest of the world than previous generation so the role of internet is something to consider as instrument which can easily influence the mass of people who join an internet connection and create linkages among them. Therefore, they are also conscious of their condition, and know their limits and the State’s one, indeed they have often a limitative trust or faith in State’s initiatives, because they do not receive less or nothing from it. Thus, what is missing is also a trustee link between the youngest people and the State institutions, that can help in reconstructing the social basis for a real step forward of the whole society in harmony. Is the role of politics under revision? Can politics actually be helpful in restore peace?

Youth_Reading Memo

With over 200 millions people under 25, Africa is the youngest continent in the world. Quite evidently, African youth is a key factor in African development as it will build the future and undertake Africa's construction. However, African youth faces numerous challenges and is left in a total developmental turmoil as it is confronted to unstable political conditions and fragile economies. Moreover, African youth gets caught up in the violent conflicts that sprikle throughout the continent, making its flourishing, and by extension the continent's full development, harder to attain. Indeed, whether we look at the Sierra Leone and Southern Sudan civil wars or insurrectionary terrorist factions such as Al Shabaab, Boko Haram or the Lord's Resistance Army, we see that a large part of belligerents are very young. This is why we can ask ourselves how can African youth define and develop itself despite being constantly exposed to violence. The reasons why African youth are engrossed in highly violent conflicts are numerous but they come down to either ideological or economical purposes, as the readings suggest it. Indeed, on one hand, as Krijn Peters and Paul Richards' interviews with former fighters show it, many young soldiers joined the RSLMF because they wanted to get revenge from the RUF rebels, because they felt threatened and they wanted to protect their invaded territories and private spheres. Other fighters, especially those who fought on the RUF side, highlight the coercitive dimension of their conscription but even within the RUF, there was at some point a compliance to their ideology. On the other hand, as Daniel Hoffman's article suggests it, war and violence are also envisioned by African youths economically, as a labour, an idea that it also reinforced by the ex-militias' mobilisation during the post-war Sierra Leone elections which alludes to, as Mats Utas and Maya Mynster Christensen, « a displacement of violence ». In other words, violence is exerced by African youth as a way to earn their living in a precarious economical context. Violence can be thus considered as a fully-fledged skill, which is potentially marketable. Either way, it seems that African youth is used as a political instrument through violence. Their vulnerability is exploited by belligerent faction in order to have obedient recruits. This is why there is a growing sentiment of distrust towards governments in the aftermath of these conflict, as Cherry Leonardi's article highlights. Indeed, following the Civil War, South Sudanese youths tend to focus on their private sphere, which alludes to their families and communities, while distancing themselves from the government's agendas. This leads us to ask ourselves : how can we define adulthood in African countries that suffered such violent conflicts ? How can African youths acquire the responsibilities in order to become fully- fledged and fuctionnal members of their society ? Indeed, Leonardi tackles the notion of marriage, which is deemed to be indispensable in order to become an adult. Nevertheless, it is not enough as it is not satisfying anymore, even though it does strengthen African youths' sense of belonging to their respective private spheres and even so, many people cannot afford to consider marriage as they do not have the financial means to build sustainable families and households. Alcinda Honwana's lecture transcript refers to this state of disarray as being a state of « waithood », as African youths are waiting to become adults while lacking the proper means to achieve this state. While strong opposition and protest movements from African youths emerged during the past decade (as the Arab Spring shows it), it has failed to operate enduring and significant changes in African governance. Poverty rates are still high and African youths struggle to get proper jobs, as Honwana records it. African youths demand proper education, more infrastructures and qualified teachers but is it really enough ? Indeed, a considerable part of African youths leave their country in order to find better structured academic systems and more jobs. On the other hand, as Peters and Richards' interviews show it, military conflicts do get in the way of education as children are abducted from very early ages. Furthermore, how can we deal with ex-militia members ? Indeed, during the post-war election in Sierra Leone, ex-militias were deployed in order to secure the country during the election, as part of a « displacement of violence ». Even though the elections took place quite peacefully, what future does that leave for militia members ? As they are volatile armed forces with no concrete allegiance, they are a threat for national and international security in Africa. Moreover, young militias need to be properly reinserted into society. One can argue that demilitarisation programs are effective to this end. However, one can also argue that local solutions might be more efficient than national solutions. Indeed, militias primary objective is territory control and the local political use of that territory. Therefore, they have to be reintegrated locally. For instance, in the DRC, in 2015, former Interahamwe militiamen were largely integrated into the Kazuhi-Biega natural park's forest ranger corps, a zone in which they actually took shelter during the Great Lakes conflicts in which they took part. This kind of local solutions which muster traditionnal political structures to which former militiamen are familiar might be more viable than national demilitarization programs favoured by governments, as the latter can always exploit these former militias through them. All in all, it seems that African youths' flourishing is closely linked to a proper governance. Indeed, governments of countries that have witnessed highly violent conflicts need to efficiently reintegrate former fighters into society in a sustainable way. They also need to regain the youths' trust and allow them to access proper educational and professional perspectives. African youths have come a long way but they are more conscious than ever and they are ready to undertake all the social and political changes that they need.