Resources_Reflection Memo

            In our last class we discussed the greed versus grievance theory of conflict and after listening to the viewpoints of my peers I have to agree that the theory is flawed. First, labeling economic activity that causes conflict as ‘greed’ is misleading. As one of my classmates said, individuals and groups involved in a conflict may be motivated by the desire to provide basic human needs for their families. It is not greed to want to reach a level of sufficiency. Furthermore, describing the economic activity behind a conflict as greed delegitimizes the conflict. Doing so excludes all other economic motives behind a given conflict when, in fact, there may be very legitimate ones behind the conflict, such as the desire to be paid a living wage.

Labeling a conflict as driven by greed has consequences. It brands all groups that are involved as degenerates. This makes it more difficult to get other states involved in stopping the conflict, as in a democracy it is challenging to drum up support to assist parties that are seen as greedy, fighting merely for economic supremacy. The cause is not worthy enough. The groups are not fighting for their independence or increased minority rights, issues which would much more easily galvanize the public in a democracy. Moreover, by misunderstanding the root causes of the conflict, attempts to end it may be misguided. Indeed, as Laura E. Seay’s article demonstrated, section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act is a product of lawmakers not understanding the relationship between violence and mineral resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Act has not resulted in any reduction of violence in that region. Thus, greed is a misnomer and should be replaced by ‘economic activity’, but then again, the ‘economic activity vs grievance’ theory just does not sound as catchy as the ‘greed versus grievance’ theory.

            Second, naming the theory ‘greed versus grievance’ simplifies the causes of conflict in the developing world to a degree in which a false dichotomy is created between the economic sources and the social and political sources of conflict. Sources of conflict are not either economic or political, they are economic and political and social.  Rarely, if ever, can the causes of a conflict be traced to a single source. It is the complex interaction of many different political, economic, and social actors that leads to the outbreak of a conflict. The false dichotomy that the greed versus grievance theory creates glosses over these interactions and does more to impair our understanding of the sources of conflict than to deepen it.

            The topic of understanding the sources of conflict leads me to the next topic that I would like to discuss: is it even possible to know the source of a conflict? This question was raised by one of my peers, but it is more accurate to ask whether we can know the sources of a conflict, since, as stated above, there is rarely a singular source. The simple answer to the question is yes. We can definitely uncover the sources of a conflict. It is a human conflict after all, not the behavior of an alien race. On the other hand, the sources of a conflict can be incredibly complex. There are actors at the individual level, the sub-national level, the national level, and the international level to consider. Often, the source of an on-going conflict has been forgotten, since the situation has evolved over the years and now groups are fighting for entirely different reasons. Ultimately, the sources of a conflict can be traced by taking all the different factors into account using the methods of social science.

            Even so, it must be acknowledged that assigning causality in the social sciences is difficult. It is simple to prove correlation. If one factor trends downwards while another trends upwards, logically people will make a connection between the two. Actually proving beyond a doubt that one factor trended up because the other trended down is an entirely different story. The article by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler that we read this week provides such an example. Collier and Hoeffler argue that lower per capita income and slower GDP growth increased the risk of civil war in developing countries, and conclude that “the rising trend of African conflict is [due to] the contingent effect of economic circumstances.” Unless I am misunderstanding the article, which is possible because it was quantitative paper, this statement is a stretch. Their paper only demonstrated that there was a correlation between higher levels of conflict and those two economic indicators, not a decisive economic causality of African conflicts. Therefore, it is possible to argue that economic circumstances contribute to African conflicts, but certainly not that they are the sole cause of them, which demonstrates the difficulty of assigning causality.

            Lastly, the greed versus grievance theory, or more so the new wars thesis, has a tinge of Eurocentricity about it. To explain, it seems like proponents of the new wars thesis are interpreting African conflicts through the spy-glass of colonialism. Why did Europeans fight for territory and colonize Africa? To obtain natural resources. To this day many western states and companies are interested in Africa solely to exploit its wealth of natural resources. Thus, from their perspective, natural resources must be the reason that conflicts have broken out in resource rich parts of Africa, as they are the only things worth fighting over. It would be interesting to know how many people in the DRC would agree with the stance that natural resources are truly the source of the conflict there.

            And finally, I want to comment on China’s relationship with African states. Last summer I read Howard French’s book China's Second Continent: How a Million Migrants are Building a New Empire in Africa and I gathered from it that China’s economic investment in African states can be a great boon to nations with small economies and limited ability to fund necessary infrastructure projects. On the individual level though, it is a different story, as French paints a picture of Chinese owned operations that are exploitive, that abuse worker’s rights, and that generally operate outside the law. It seems that China can certainly help African nations at a state level, but can do severe harm on an individual one. China’s investment is, therefore, a double-edged sword that African states must recognize and take measures to protect their citizens.

            P.S.: I think a seminar on Africa’s relationship with the international community, and especially China, would be an excellent addition to the course.

Resources_Reading Memo

• The articles emphasized perfectly the fact that there is a global misunderstanding about the place of diamond trade in the financing of conflict and show up that there is a plurality of other economic sources to the financing of the different militias and rebels groups in the African civil wars. Furthermore, the roots of the different conflicts, here the one in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone particularly, are proven to be numerous. But these articles, by emphasizing the origins and progress of these conflicts raised a thought, which is the role and influence of what we could call the international situation.

Indeed, by describing the conflicts in Sierra Leone and in the DRC, one might observes that the civil wars here studied are mostly seen as internal conflict and then on the national scale. But the origins, localisations and alliances of these conflicts lead to put some external actors on the origins of those conflicts. If it is impossible to say and defend the idea that these conflicts happened because international actors, it is difficult to go against the idea that the raise of such conflicts have been possible thanks to the international relations and actors, such as the neighbouring states. It is possible to wonder in which extend the external actors were central in the support of the rebellious groups and then gave the means to these actors to fight and be able to start and continue such conflicts. We can keep here the examples of the DRC and Sierra Leone where, in both cases, the rebellious groups started the fight from areas close the a border, far from the central power, in the South near Liberia in Sierra Leone, and in the East near the Rwanda and Burundi in the case of the DRC. These proximity with neighbouring states is not only geographical but also strategically since these rebellious movement seems to have been supported on a political level by neighbouring actors who could have been also paramilitary groups or political leaders. This proximity gave the opportunity, especially in the case of Liberia for the RUF in Sierra Leone to get political and military skills from the support of Charles Taylor before the real beginning of the civil war. Furthermore, in both cases, the role of the border area was also important for the financing by trade and the military support. In the case of the Sierra Leones war, if diamonds were not the center of the economical financing of the RUF fighting during the conflict as it was explained in the articles, the part of gain from diamonds was possible by the proximity with neighbouring states that make the illegal trade easier and possible in a country where it is impossible to circulate for such armed groups and trade such products, especially after international sanctions such as the one lead by the UN and the Obama’s administration about the “blood diamonds” in the African civil wars. It is also thanks to this proximity that such rebellious group are able to find military support, as it is the case for the RUF in Sierra Leone that could import military equipment from the ex-Eastern Bloc through Burkina Faso and Liberia as it is explained in the articles. Finally, these civil conflicts are all characterized by the international interference by both UN and/or external military intervention and deployment. In those cases, we can see that once again, those conflicts cannot be studied on a purely internal scale. The presence of British mines companies in Sierra Leone for example can explain in part why London send troops in Sierra Leone to maintain order and fight the RUF, rebellious group that was frightening its economic interests in the country. Again, this kind of intervention could also support the continuation of the conflict, as it was the case with the Nigerian blue helmets in Sierra Leone who contributed to the illegal trade by adopting the behaviours of local armed groups such as the illegal diamonds trade and then explain why these troops were so reluctant to withdraw from Sierra Leone.

I believe then that once could defend that, if these conflicts are indeed civil wars, they should be studied on an internal scale because the international relations play a lot in those conflict by giving the mean to start by more important to continue such instable situation and then threaten the stability of neighbouring countries, and that even the peacekeeping intervention could be justified or willing by interesting states who reach personal goals or interests.

• A second point I would like to raise for further discussions would be the question of the impacts of the destruction of the social order by internal conflicts and so basically the impacts of the new wars strategy on traditional social organization and its role on the continuation of the instability through time.

Indeed, one characteristic of the recent civil war in Sierra Leone and the current instability in the DRC would be destruction and modifications of the social order, mostly traditional in the rural areas, because of the civil wars. It is possible to wonder to which extend the civil war contributed to create a long term instability loop by the way those conflicts were made by both armed groups. When we look to the civil wars here studied, in Sierra Leone and DRC, but mostly in all civil conflicts, the battlegrounds are mostly situated in the rural areas where the rebellious groups could better develop and survive. The conflicts happen then in areas where the main social organization present is a traditional one, based on tribalism with a strong social hierarchy and economically based on traditional revenues such as agriculture or mining. Thus, by destroying all this traditional social model, the different militias or governmental forces increase the exclusion of those areas both socially and economically and raise new issues susceptible to support a continuation of the conflicts or make new ones more likely to happen. As developed in the article about the civil war in Sierra Leone, the conflict was more likely to happen by the frustration of many youths of the rural areas who gave the different armed groups main of its troops, but is also destabilised the rural organization by decreasing the role of the local chiefs, using and victimized by the different actors of the conflict. Furthermore, many villages were destroyed and people forced to flee, sometimes to the big cities, especially in the case of the more educated. Then some areas were deprived of intellectual chiefs, sometimes totally destroyed or deprived of power. Then, after the end of the conflict and the return of many youths to the villages, the order was totally changed and leads to anarchy. And with the international support, the situation didn’t improve. Indeed, by letting the local chiefs decided how to distributed the different kind of aid, they basically just reactive the older system that was originally one of the causes of the civil war, or at least to the global dissatisfaction in the youth community that lead to the grouping of them into military groups. We assist then to a kind of loop of instability, and even decrease of the situation. Indeed if the old order seems to be building up again and then lead again to the risk of the rise of some rebellious groups or ideas, the situation of post-conflict weak reconstruction make it even more likely to happen. By having a weak government incapable to take care of all the rural areas, a post-conflict situation which increased the awareness of the youths by the ideology of some groups such as the RUF by showing a new societal organization, and the willing of the old chiefs or traditional elites to keep this kind of organization, we assist to a situation more war-prone than ever.

It is then possible to wonder to which extend the traditional social organization plays a role in the loop of instability in the rural areas of the post-civil war Africa and if the political powers should try to change it, improve it or accept the fact that those traditional organization were already destroyed by the conflicts and try to move on.

Resources_Reflection Memo

During this seminar, we discussed the topic of mineral resources and their connection with conflicts and violence in African states. We agreed that the topic of mineral resources in this context is multidimensional and the solution to this problem is therefore not easy to find.

We tried to clarify the issue of the land which caused a little bit of confusion, as it may be seemingly the same because the minerals are found in it. However, the land is more than just a soil. It has certain meaning for people who live there, it forms their identity. People are bonded to their land, and for example even a rising wave of nationalism in Europe does not disprove this. We agreed that the phenomenon of globalization is not having that much effect to African peoples to make them think of themselves as global citizens and therefore less bounded to their land. Exactly on the other hand, we should consider this aspect of land much more in our attempts to resolve mineral conflicts in Africa, because so far it has been rather overlooked.

Moreover, we tried to identify the reason why African people fight in such mineral conflict. We can easily understand the motivation of higher military personnel, commanders, generals. They want to secure a stable job in the aftermath of the conflict, the reintegration in armed forces or getting a higher official rank in armed forces, honours. Based on the reading by Laudati, I would add to this point that some beneficial positions were not only in the army but also in new government or state enterprises. And what is the paradox in Congo, as the author put it, it is sad that if some armed group is killing people and resisting, it has greater chance to gain a beneficial position in the state apparatus rather than ending in a jail. And for me, this is one of the basic problems in Congolese society which need to be focused on and treated in order to resolve the complexity of the conflict.

But what about foot soldiers and ordinary people who join violence? What are their reasons? During the class, we argued that they are probably trying to get control over their own lives and destiny or they see the conflict as a chance to make their life better in some way, to make some profit out of it. We need to keep in mind that even though we could possibly understand their arguments for joining the conflict, these are not in any case a justification for being violent. I would also like to elaborate a little more on this point of civilians joining the conflict. As Laudati mentions this in his work, we may find it alarming that the small-scale violence which is present in everyday life of Congolese civilians is overlooked by the international community. I cannot really understand how is this possible. Even though looting and robberies have become common in Congo, they should be addressed with effective measures to deal with them. Such situation cannot stay untreated under no condition. How can we find a cure to African conflict if we are overlooking various small parts of it? We need to address the very roots and grasp the problem in its complexity if we want to find an effective solution to it.

Similar is the problem in mineral conflict resolution as we could have observed in the article by Seay about section 1502. Even though we did not bring this topic on during our debate in class, I want to mention it because it is a good example of what is wrong with our treatment of the African mineral conflict. As we know, this law was introduced as a measure to control Congolese mineral export. This was intended to cope with the violence in Congo. However, the ongoing crisis was understood mostly in terms of the mineral resources and their trade, which led US officials to misinterpret the roots of the conflict and address not the wrong cause, but only one cause out of many. Logically, such approach could not have been successful. Moreover, the section 1502 had serious side-effects: great number of Congolese miners who have lost their jobs, leaving themselves and their families without a reliable source of income. I believe that we cannot blame this law for its failures but it certainly serves us a good example of what should we be aware in the processes of resolution of African mineral conflicts.

One student presented his point of view that in fact, minerals are the primary source of this conflict and even that the West makes the situation even worse as Western companies keep buying conflict minerals, for example for a production of electronics. He proposed that Africa should turn away from the West and towards China, in terms of trade. But collectively, the group opposed such idea because trading only with one partner makes you trapped. It is rather better for African countries to make trade with both and have a greater spectrum of possibilities.

But most importantly, it is really wrong to perceive the Congolese conflict only from the mineral-focused point of view, as we could have seen on several examples. It is undeniably a broad issue. We really cannot claim that there is only one cause of the Congolese conflict. Instead, we should seek as many factors as possible in order to understand it the best we can, to deepen our discourse over this problem and then maybe really solve it. Such model should be applied generally to any conflict. In the case of DRC, yes, we can admit that mineral resources have an important role in it but we cannot keep trying to find simply one solution to one problem. The overall context of the conflict is very important and cannot be neglected. It is in fact dangerous to use some kind of generalizing labels in the process of naming the sources of conflicts. 

Resources_Reading Memo

When it comes to any conflict in the world and its reconciliation, resolution or containment there are various issues to consider. First of all we have to define actors engaged in the conflict, their nature and most of all why they have become involved in the conflict in the first place. It leads us then to underlying causes that perpetuate the conflict and violence which have to be assessed and “treated” in order to make the settlement or containment possible. However, could these causes be understood only as motives of violent actors which made them wage a war? Or are these causes more “sophisticated”, using the terminology of Johan Galtung, structural that make the war inevitable within the particular social structure? Finally what I would stress out are impacts of such measures aiming to influence or terminate the conflict. I am referring mainly to impacts influencing civilians but rebels, elites, soldiers, government leaders and others whose lives are shaped not only by the war but also by the proposals which aim more or less to set up peace.

   Leaving the topic of violent actors and their nature aside, how can we come to the right conclusion about the causes of any given conflict? Is it possible for a conflict to be fuelled just by single source or are there multiple factors that led violent actors to war? And if there could be defined various factors are they disrupting the peace on sole basis, simultaneously or do they cause each other and thus create the instability and conflict environment? With regards to the cases of Sierra Leone and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo many experts and analysts have reached the agreement that what stays and fuels these two conflicts are mineral resources. Thus they are called “conflict minerals”. Even one of my colleagues had provided positive answer to the question if these conflicts are really/only about minerals, the question we had been dealing throughout the whole lesson. And then the following question was asked: “Would the Congo (as we were targeting mostly this country through the discussion) look like it looks now if it wouldn’t be for mineral resources?” In my own opinion it probably wouldn’t. It is due to the realities of Congo provided in the readings, the most significant of which I would say is that considerable part of Congolese population relies on this “job opportunity” and that the mining has represented the main source of earnings for many Congolese families for generations. In this regard I would agree with the positive answer of my colleague, too. To be more precise I argue that indeed minerals could constitute main source of violence and conflict when it comes to countries where they also represent the “bread and butter” for civilian population.

On the one hand, it was rightfully pointed out that “armed groups don’t fight because they have access to mineral wealth” (Seay, 2012, p.13). On the other hand possession of mines can be very beneficial for violent actors if the lives of civilians rest upon mining activity as well as if the whole economy of the particular state rest upon it. Another point to this assumption was provided in the text of Collier and Hoeffler who claims that rising trend of conflicts in African states is not caused by their social structures (religion or ethnic fractionalization, ethnic domination, etc) but by their economic developments or rather stagnation and underdevelopment. They came into a conclusion that what makes African states more prone to conflict is lack of economic performance that would lead to the growth in their economy. Moreover it is also the reason why “mineral rich” states are more dependent on mineral export and in this way also why the mineral resources might become the main source of conflict (according to their research it amounts to 17% of GDP) (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002).

Nevertheless, I would not agree with Collier’s statement which claims that “new wars” (defined as a conflict which contain violent struggle over private material gains as well as political goals and social ends) today are fought rather due to economic than political reasons (Collier in Richards, 2003). In spite of the fact that most of the rebel movement, radicals or government opposition factions do fight to reach some gains and in this way it may also imply to fight over money resources, it is also important to ask what does these resources and money itself represent. Why armed groups and violent actors struggling over mineral resources? What are their motives to do that? My own opinion would not lean towards the dilemma of greed versus grievance. What I think is that minerals as other resources can be translated into the debate over money. In addition, the struggle over such money resources could be also interpreted as a struggle over power. By the power I am referring to the ability of someone to shape or manipulate conditions and environment in the way that serves their interests, ideology, etc. It implies also that this someone is capable to affect other actors, be it individuals or some local, regional or international organizations, and the way how they behave and act. In a simple way to make them take actions which they would not if it would not be for these “power holders”.  I thus argue that in countries such as Sierra Leone or eastern D. R. Congo, which are rich in natural resources and minerals plus more or less dependent on their export, these represents mainly means of power. Furthermore since it is mostly the civilian population who holds on such resources to sustain their own lives and lives of their family members it is thus these civilians who constitute to be the most vulnerable target of this power. On the other hand, it could be questioned if the struggle would not occur if mineral resources were not present in “mineral rich” states such as Sierra Leone or eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Could it be that if someone wants to fight he finds the way to pursue it? Or if someone wants the “power” he finds the source and starts the struggle over it?

To conclude on this topic, it was described by Laura E. Seay that the importance on minerals, in the cases of Sierra Leone and eastern D. R. Congo, stems from a simple logic. It says that violent and armed groups possess mines and are involved in mineral trade in order to provide themselves with bulk of money, as already mentioned, which as follows ensures that violent activities of these groups can continue smoothly. Thus it could be concluded that to stop or deny access of these groups to mines and mineral trade would mean to cut them off of money resources. Consequently it would also lead to decrease in violence and to the termination of the conflict since the group can no longer afford the necessary instruments such as weapons or ammunitions to wage war (Seay, 2012). If it would be that simple it would then probably mean that the positive answer provided about conflict minerals in the cases of Sierra Leone and eastern D. R. Congo is indeed enough and the conflict could be resolved. Unfortunately as the data provided indicates this logic does not prove to be true in reality. In the criticism of Dodd-Frank 1502 it was illustrated that such legislation was not able to decrease or stop the violence in the Congo and what is more it hurt mainly civilians who are dependent of the mining industry.  On the contrary what I think is that it is probably the best approach how to deal with any conflict. I am not referring to this particular act but the fact that to solve any conflict it is inevitable to start somewhere. This means to find the “worst” of the “worst” and deal with it firstly and then continue in such manner until some kind of a stable and peace environment can be established. Keeping and weighting pros and cons of such measures and considering impacts they may pose on individuals as well as on the country or region.