African Union_Reading Memo

Kwesi Aning and Fifi Edu-Afful’s article deals with the role of increasing African agency in human rights and other crisis interventions in the recent years through the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Their main argument traces the shift in values that accompanied the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union in 2002. In tandem with this analysis, the authors examine the practices of the Economic Community of West African States in approaching interventions into human rights crises. The authors begin by enumerating the value shifts they observed in the transition from OAU to AU. Specifically, they address a shift in the foundational ethical framework from one of radical cultural relativism to radical universalism. This accompanies a concrete politicalideological shift from a sacrosanct respect for national sovereignty to what I see as a cosmopolitan constructivist approach to nationhood and identity among Africans. It also gives birth, the authors claim, to a “new pan-Africanism” under which common cultural identity as Africans ought to trump national (or sub-national) identity, especially in cases of collective security. The authors further assert that the impetus for constructing a new pan-Africanism stems from “a deep desire to revive a marginalized and exploited continent that has been ravaged by centuries of slavery, colonialism, neocolonialism, exploitation, oppression, conflict and hunger.” In this way they problematize the issue of African identity and offer both practical and moral grounds for the cosmopolitan endeavor. As part of the undeniably daunting project of constructing such a cosmopolitan identity, the authors point to the crystallization of the OAU policies of “‘nonintervention’, ‘noninterference’, ‘[in]violability of inherited borders’ and the sovereign equality of AU member states” into “new and widely subscribed global doctrines of ‘responsibility to protect’, humanitarian intervention, ‘responsibility while protecting’, and ‘nonindifference’.” This shift from an ideological to a practical foundation of the African community has been given the chance to prove its mettle by displaying agency and decisive action in several cases of resolving violent conflicts on the continent. The constitutive act of the African Union coupled with the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus lay the political groundwork from which the agency derives the authority to intervene on behalf of the safety of civilians. The authors draw a sharp contrast here with the OAU, claiming that the AU differs from it by providing an “integrated level of continental governance that could rival any other well-developed continental body.” The practical catalyst for this integration appears to be an interventionist attitude that has soundly replaced a doctrine of sovereignty. The criteria laid out for intervention in a sovereign nation at conflict include, but are not limited to, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The AU Peace and Security Council is the main body charged with analyzing and addressing these threats to human security. This security-oriented body has a civil counterpart in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance. Alongside the emergence of the AU and its governance bodies, the ECOWAS has increased its scope to influence security and civil affairs. In 1993, following conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS updated its peace and security treat in preparation for greater regional security integration. By 2006, it had adopted the Conflict Prevention Framework, facilitating the incorporation of R2P into its protocols. In this context R2P was delineated to include the responsibility to prevent, react to, and rebuild after conflict. Having addressed the regional security integration framework in place by the mid-2000s, the authors offer three fairly brief case studies examining the role and efficacy of African cosmopolitan governance institutions in conflict interventions. In Mali in 2012, after a coupe d’etat that placed an Islamic extremist group in power, ECOWAS organized an intervention mission that was ultimately absorbed into the African Union’s mission. However, before action could occur, France intervened as the former colonial power in the nation. In Cote D’ivoire in 2010, ECOWAS supported the opposition candidate in a contested election in which the incumbent refused to relinquish power. This support included decisively stating their support without hesitation and petitioning the UN Security Council for sanctions against the illegitimate president. The AU meanwhile ordered an independent electoral commission to swear in the opposition and established a high representative to oversee the implementation of the resolution, which was given a two week ultimatum for enactment. Ultimately the UNSC authorized a peacekeeping mission aimed at protecting civilians amid violent political turmoil. In Libya in 2011, during the Benghazi Crisis, the AUPSC devised a roadmap for conflict resolution that was ultimately rejected by the Libyan transitional government before the US and allies intervened to remove Gaddafi from power. From these studies we can see that as of yet the pan-African cosmopolitan agencies have not had any independent success in leading a humanitarian intervention. This should not be discouraging, particularly because the asymmetry in power between the AU and global and postcolonial powers such as NATO or France makes it difficult for it to act decisively and independently. The bold steps taken in the Cote D’ivoire incident may have expedited the UNSC decision. The steps taken in the cases of Mali and Libya also indicate compliance with international norms and a proactive approach to conflict resolution within Africa, as well as a lack of trepidation at violating a state’s national sovereignty when clear human rights abuses are taking place, as stipulated in their foundational document. My first question, therefore deals with the future role of non-African and post-colonial powers in resolving crises, which we can see in all three case studies. As the charter for the AU focuses on the traumatic experiences of colonialism, I wonder whether the future of African regional security integration should pursue more direct involvement, possibly with passive support from global or postcolonial powers, or whether continued cooperation with these powers, whose military capabilities are greater and among whom cooperation is more established, would be a more prudent path. As the construction of a pan-African identity is central to the social goals of the Union and as this goal is informed in no small part by colonial history, one imagines that taking direct responsibility for African affairs would send a symbolic message to the pan-African community that the AU is a strong and respectable organization. On the other hand, the cooperative approach towards former colonists is more practical, and this willingness to take a practical approach could also be a perceived source of strength, as instead of focusing on a symbolic independence from former colonists, the AU takes an authoritative role in assessing and condemning crises and takes the most expedient steps available to resolve them. My second question deals with the constructivist aspects embedded in the tenets of practical regional security integration measures by both ECOWAS and the AU, as well as the possibilities and limitations posed by the cultural-political side of the AU mission, which is regrettably not addressed at length by the authors in comparison to the concrete cases of integration. I specifically speculate whether the ECOWAS CPF should become integrated into the AUPSC. The two parent organizations have very different functions, but their securityintegration wings could face overlapping interests and bureaucratic roadblocks if the integrated security project advances successfully. On the one hand, the trust across all of Africa in the cosmopolitan platform could dissolve if there is a feeling that the Western economic bloc has come into a dominant position in the pan-African political sphere. On the other hand, shaping a pan-African identity requires trust building and pragmatism, so if ECOWAS is able to play a significant role in security integration, its integration, if handled smoothly, would do a lot to instill this trust. I also present a third question regarding the African Charter on Democracy. Advancing the goal of the cosmopolitan agencies from merely preventing and reacting to concrete human security issues to actual state-building in volatile areas would be a huge step for integration. However, the possibility to ignore sovereignty over spreading democratic governance could be seen as a step too far. I wonder whether it is worth the risk from a pragmatic standpoint, and whether it is justifiable or even feasible fro a political perspective.